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COMMENT 
LET THE PIRATES FEND FOR THEMSELVES: ARISTA 
RECORDS V. DOES 1-16 AND DISPELLING THE 
INTERNET’S RING OF GYGES MYTH  
Daniel J. Yamauchi† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The lure of invisibility, or its more realistic cousin anonymity, is no new 
temptation; individuals have desired and pursued various levels of privacy 
throughout history for a myriad of reasons. While many motives are 
perfectly acceptable and uncontested, the coveted veil of anonymity 
provides a tempting advantage: the unknown man is unaccountable.1 In the 
Republic, Plato references the mythological “Ring of Gyges”2 to explore 
the nefarious effect of this unusual power and its ethical implications. 
Suppose now that there were two such magic rings [granting 
invisibility], and the just put on one of them and the unjust the 
other; no man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature that 
he would stand fast in justice. No man would keep his hands off 
what was not his own when he could safely take what he liked 
out of the market, or go into houses and lie with anyone at his 
pleasure, or kill or release from prison whom he would, and in 
all respects be like a god among men. Then the actions of the just 
would be as the actions of the unjust; they would both come to 
last at the same point. And this we may truly affirm to be a great 
proof that a man is just, not willingly or because he thinks that 
                                                                                                                           
 † Editor-in-Chief, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 5. J.D. (2011); Liberty 
University School of Law; B.A., University of Arizona. I dedicate this Comment to my 
parents for their unwavering love, support, and encouragment, and to the Warrens for 
providing me a home away from home. Thank you to Andrew Connors, Matthew Hegarty, 
and Ben Walton for your editorial guidance, mentoring, and friendship. Psalm 115:1. 
 1. To be more precise, this statement should be qualified to reflect that one remains 
unaccountable only to other men. For Christians, the Bible explicitly acknowledges that God 
is omnipresent, and nothing can be hidden from his view: “Woe to those who deeply hide 
their plans from the LORD, And whose deeds are done in a dark place, and they say, ‘Who 
sees us?’ or ‘Who knows us?’” Isaiah 29:15 (NASB). 
 2. The accepted title for this legend derives from chapter ten in a dialogue discussing 
how Gyge’s ring empowered Hades when he placed it on his helmet, thus rendering him 
invisible. PLATO, Republic: Book II, in FIVE GREAT DIALOGUES 253, 484 (Louise Ropes 
Loomis ed., B. Jowett trans., 1942). 
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justice is any good to him individually, but of necessity, for 
wherever anyone thinks that he can safely be unjust, there he is 
unjust. . . . If you could imagine anyone obtaining this power of 
becoming invisible, and never doing any wrong or touching what 
was another’s, he would be thought by the lookers-on to be a 
most wretched idiot, although they would praise him to one 
another’s faces, and keep up appearances with one another from 
a fear that they too might suffer injustice.3 
Of course no such rings exist, but the intrigue still persists. There is 
arguably no greater example of a forum where Plato’s theories can be tested 
than today’s Internet, where, as this Comment will note, anonymity is a 
luxury assumedly imbedded in the Internet’s framework and fiercely 
defended by many individuals.4 
Since the advent of the World Wide Web in the early 1990s, and the 
exponentially growing use of its vast array of networks and online 
communications, the Internet has proffered a collection of legal issues that 
courts and legislators have struggled to accommodate. At the core of many 
contemporary legal battles are the perplexing issues of privacy, identity, and 
                                                                                                                           
 3. Id. at 257-59. Plato’s observations here do not entirely ignore the possible 
observation of an all-seeing, all-knowing deity, or source of universal moral conscience. See 
Mark L. McPherran, Platonic Religion, in A COMPANION TO PLATO 252-59 (Hugh H. Benson 
ed., 2006) (discussing Plato’s considering a “Maker-god,” immortality, and a Final 
Judgment). Many more allegories and classical works include references to the power of 
invisibility. For an interesting discussion of the semiology of the Ring of Gyges, see MARC 
SHELL, THE ECONOMY OF LITERATURE 13, 31 (1993) (arguing that “the power of Platonic 
Gyges . . . is also the power of the archetypal tyrant,” and that the power to “transform 
visibles into invisibles and invisibles into visibles . . . is associated with new economic and 
political forms that shattered the previous world and its culture.”). This theory is especially 
interesting to consider in the context of this Comment because as communities shift 
important transactions and communications from the tangible, physical world to online, 
virtual frameworks, individuals with the power to cloak their identity have a substantial 
advantage over others.  
 4. This Comment touches on the moral and ethical principles of an individual’s 
behavior under the cloak of online anonymity, but does not attempt to address Plato’s 
theories. It is noteworthy, however, to observe the effect that the Internet has had on certain 
issues that society broadly recognizes as immoral. See, e.g., Net Blamed for Rise in Children 
Porn, BBC NEWS (Jan. 12, 2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3387377.stm 
(“‘The internet completely changed [the accessibility of child pornography]. People perhaps 
with a suppressed or latent interest in it have now got a mechanism. . . . they think the 
internet is anonymous.’”) (emphasis added). Of course the Internet’s cloak of anonymity has 
also provided positive, non-nefarious advantages to individuals, and this Comment does not 
suggest that either side’s benefits outweigh the other.  
2011] DISPELLING THE INTERNET’S RING OF GYGES MYTH 543 
 
 
anonymity.5 The Internet seems to have developed under the general 
supposition that privacy and anonymity reflect “a cornerstone of our 
democratic society.”6 Indeed, the First Amendment provides a great deal of 
protection to those who wish to communicate anonymously online.7 
Nevertheless, with the widespread use of Internet services and the 
increasing integration of society and culture with virtual environments, the 
scope of online anonymity afforded to an individual has come under 
increased scrutiny.8 
The development of general privacy, identity, and anonymity 
jurisprudence is voluminous with broad implications and consequences. 
This Comment primarily focuses on the contemporary understanding of 
these issues in the context of the Internet, and addresses the procedural 
obstacles presented when attempting to litigate claims against unidentified 
defendants. In particular, copyright owners, such as those represented by 
the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA)9 and the Record 
                                                                                                                           
 5. Ken D. Kumayama, Note, A Right to Pseudonymity, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 427, 437 
(2009) (noting “identity does not exist but merely seems to manifest through individuals’ 
relationships in society” (referencing an opinion espoused in ANTHONY GIDDENS, 
MODERNITY AND SELF-IDENTITY: SELF AND SOCIETY IN THE LATE MODERN AGE 52 (1991))). 
Some of the more interesting conflicts involving anonymous parties that are yet to reach the 
stages of formal litigation are worth noting, including the international sensation of the 
recent WikiLeaks scandals (see Glenn Kessler, WikiLeaks’s Unveiling of Secret State 
Department Cables Exposes U.S. Diplomacy, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2010, at A1, available 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/28/AR201011280 
2395.html), the attacks of the hacker group Anonymous on MasterCard, Visa, and HB Gary 
(see Nate Anderson, How one Man Tracked Down Anonymous—and Paid a Heavy Price, in 
UNMASKED (Ars Technica Kindle ed. 2011), and the hacker ‘Jester’ who, almost 
militaristically, takes down webpages maintained by WikiLeaks, Muslim Jihadist 
recruitment groups, and the Westboro Baptist Church (see JESTER’S COURT, 
http://th3j35t3r.wordpress.com/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2011); see also Anthony M. Freed, 
Patriot Hacker the Jester’s Libyan Psyops Campaign, INFOSEC ISLAND (Mar. 30, 2011), 
https://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/12745-Patriot-Hacker-The-Jesters-Libyan-Psyops-
Campaign.html, 2011 (providing an overview of the Jester’s activities)).  
 6. DIGITAL ANONYMITY AND THE LAW: TENSIONS AND DIMENSIONS 1 (C. Nicoll, J.E.J. 
Prins & M.J.M. van Dellen eds., 2003) [hereinafter DIGITAL ANONYMITY]. 
 7. See JONATHAN D. HART, INTERNET LAW: A FIELD GUIDE 33-42 (5th ed. 2007). 
 8. Id. 
 9. The MPAA represents the six major movie studios, including Walt Disney, 
Paramount, Sony Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal City, and Warner Brothers. 
FAQ, MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, http://www.mpaa.org/faq (last visited 
Apr. 18, 2011). 
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Industry Association of America (RIAA),10 often face the preliminary 
hurdle of discovering and unveiling the identity of copyright infringers, a 
process that frequently cripples and ends the litigation process before the 
merits of the claim are even considered.11 These complications arise in 
large part due to an irresolute body of jurisprudence addressing a First 
Amendment right to anonymity on the Internet.12 Although certain unlawful 
activities, such as copyright infringement, libel, and defamation, are 
categorically considered outside the scope of First Amendment privacy 
protection,13 individuals possess legitimate privacy rights for many 
activities that take place on the Internet.14 However, the degree of privacy 
and anonymity the law affords individuals, and what procedures establish 
and diminish these rights, is unclear. 
                                                                                                                           
 10. Similar to the MPAA, the RIAA represents a collection of music labels and artists 
who “create, manufacture and/or distribute approximately 85% of all legitimate recorded 
music produced and sold in the United States.” Who We Are, THE RECORD INDUSTRY 
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, http://www.riaa.com/aboutus.php (last visited April 18, 2011). 
The RIAA is often the named plaintiff in cases involving copyright infringement of its 
members’ work, which is part of the RIAA “work[] to protect the intellectual property and 
First Amendment rights of artists and music labels; conduct consumer, industry and 
technical research; and monitor and review state and federal laws, regulations and policies.” 
Id. 
 11. See, e.g., Arista Records LLC v. Does 1-17, No. 6:07-CV—6197-HO (D. Or. filed 
Oct. 27, 2008) (moving to dismiss the case after several unsuccessful attempts to discover 
the identity of 17 copyright infringers at the University of Oregon). In the notorious case of 
Atlantic v. Andersen, the RIAA brought a copyright infringement suit against Anderson, a 
disabled single mother, for her nine-year-old daughter’s illegally sharing files using Kazaa, a 
popular file-sharing program. No. 05-933-AS (D. Or. filed Dec. 13, 2006). The case was 
dismissed when the error was discovered, and Anderson filed a countersuit against the RIAA 
for racketeering, fraud, and deceptive business practices. See Eric Bangeman, RIAA throws 
in the towel in Atlantic v. Anderson, ARS TECHNICA (June 4, 2007), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2007/06/riaa-throws-in-the-towel-in-atlantic-v-
andersen.ars (discussing Atlantic v. Andersen and other similar cases). 
 12. See Ray Beckerman, How the RIAA Litigation Process Works, (Apr. 9, 2008) 
(unpublished article) (on file with author) available at 
http://beckermanlegal.com/pdf/?file=/howriaa.htm (discussing and summarizing several 
cases where various courts have come to different conclusions on what degree of privacy is 
afforded to individuals and what legal procedures must be taken to ascertain the real 
identity). 
 13. See Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 253 (D. Conn. 2008) (noting that 
“[t]he United States Supreme Court has . . . made clear that the First Amendment’s 
protection extends to speech on the internet,” but that this freedom “is not absolute and does 
not protect speech that otherwise would be unprotected.” (citing McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 353 (1995)). 
 14. Id.  
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Part II of this Comment discusses the understanding of anonymity that 
has developed due to the structure of the Internet and the resulting 
legislation and litigation. Part III introduces and outlines the case of Arista 
Records v. Does 1-16 to date.15 Part IV suggests that the procedural 
accommodation of an individual’s anonymity be reconsidered, and 
proposes a framework to determine who mediates the disclosure of an 
individual’s identity on the Internet. Finally, this Comment suggests that 
current legislation addressing copyright infringement should be amended to 
accommodate new technological procedures, or courts should adopt a broad 
reading that permits lawful subpoena power when the defendant is 
anonymous. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
In many cases involving disputes over online conduct, parties bringing 
suit against unknown defendants, known as “John Does,” encounter 
procedural complications at the outset of the litigation.16 In such cases, the 
defendant may only be known by the numerical identifier assigned to him 
by his Internet Service Provider (ISP), and translating this number into a 
name can only be accomplished with the assistance of the ISP, which most 
often requires a court order.17 Attaining such an order, however, is often 
                                                                                                                           
 15. After this Comment was completed and accepted for publication, the District Court 
for the District of Columbia released an opinion that has gained considerable publicity and 
has been cautioned as “what may be the most important decision to date in the ongoing 
mass-litigation campaign against thousands of individuals who traded copyrighted movies 
on BitTorrent.” Eriq Gardner, Mass-Suing of Pirates Gets Shot In Arm Thanks to DC Judge, 
THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Mar. 23, 2011, 10:44 AM), 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/mass-suing-pirates-gets-shot-170403 (reporting 
on Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-1,062, No. CIV.A. 10-455 BAH, 2011 WL 
996786 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2011)). Addressing Motions to Quash or Modify subpoenas that 
were issued in three separate, pending copyright infringement cases, Judge Beryl A. Howell 
issued a memorandum opinion that opponents interpreted as “waiv[ing] away procedural 
objections, jurisdictional concerns, and First Amendment arguments and will allow several 
film production companies to pursue what some have termed the ‘mass-suing’ of alleged 
pirates.” Id. While the author of this Comment does not agree with the court’s ultimate 
conclusion, this case addressed principles of Internet anonymity and privacy that, 
unfortunately, substantiate the underlying premise of this Comment. Accordingly, this 
Comment addresses Judge Howell’s opinion at relevant sections, and for purposes of 
academic debate, sides with many of the legal conclusions found in Call of the Wild. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. See Call of the Wild, 2011 WL 996786 at *14 (noting that “Amici and Time Warner 
do not dispute that the plaintiffs have no other sources for the information they seek.”). 
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denied on procedural and policy grounds.18 As this Comment argues, these 
difficulties are in part due to legislators’ and courts’ failure to react to the 
rapidly developing and adjusting Internet by providing procedural 
safeguards for end-users, ISPs, and plaintiffs seeking relief. 
A.  The Architecture of the Internet and the Debate over Anonymity 
The Internet is an international system of networked computers.19 There 
are many different types of computer networks, but, in the most general and 
basic sense, these networks consist of “two or more computers connected 
by some means through which they are capable of sharing information.”20 
Relying on the Internet Protocol Suite, computers are assigned numerical 
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses that identify their location on networks.21 
For the majority of consumers, these IP addresses are assigned by their 
ISP.22 For students on university or college campuses, local administrators 
oversee network access and assign IP addresses to connected computers.23 
These IP addresses become the sole virtual identity linking online activity 
with the physical computer and thereby its user.24 Accordingly, users first 
                                                                                                                           
 18. See Kumayama, supra note 5, at 430-37. 
 19. Chris Nicoll, Concealing and Revealing Identity on the Internet, in DIGITAL 
ANONYMITY, supra note 6, at 102.  
 20. GARY A. DONAHUE, NETWORK WARRIOR 3 (2007). 
 21. JOHN BLOOMER, POWER PROGRAMMING WITH RPC 105-07 (1992); ROBERT JONES, 
INTERNET FORENSICS 11 (2005). 
 22. There are many ISPs in the United States, with five of the largest including AT&T, 
Comcast, Road Runner, Verizon, and America Online. Top 23 U.S. ISPs by Subscriber: Q3 
2008, ISP PLANET, http://www.isp-planet.com/research/rankings/usa.html (last visited Apr. 
18, 2011). 
 23. For example, here at Liberty University, the administrators limit Internet access by 
requiring all computers to install software that identifies the computer as linked to a student 
or faculty identity and account. HelpDesk Policies, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY, 
https://www.liberty.edu/index.cfm?PID=17871 (last visited Apr. 18, 2011). This static link 
between the student’s identity and his online activities should dismiss any supposition of 
anonymity, and the University makes no illusion to protecting this information from 
legitimate inquiring outsiders, as the “Copyright Compliance” section notes:  
Failure to adhere [to copyright compliance] is against the law and may result in 
the FBI as well as the RIAA coming after those in defiance. If served a 
subpoena, Liberty will give out names in compliance with the law. Remember 
that you are ultimately responsible for any uploading or downloading of files 
from your computer that infringe on copyright. 
Id. 
 24. It is important to note, however, that this is a simplification of an often much-more 
difficult process. Matching the IP address to the real identity of the actual user is often a 
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accessing the Internet are known only by their IP address, and may 
voluntarily reveal their true identity at will or choose to remain generally 
incognito.25 Individuals may choose to forgo anonymity by communicating 
their true identity directly to others, for instance, by voluntarily revealing 
identifying information on a website or by revealing financial information 
in commercial exchanges.26 
Issues of involuntary disclosure tend to arise when a person has acted 
unlawfully and could be subject to civil liability or criminal penalties.27 
                                                                                                                           
difficult process, even for an ISP. The technical reasons for this are beyond the scope of this 
Comment, but for an explanation and in-depth discussion, see Nicoll, supra note 19, at 101-
08. 
 25. Id. at 100. 
 26. Facebook’s “Privacy Guide” page entitled “Controlling How You Share” offers an 
excellent example of this proposition, where the internationally popular social networking 
titan advises users that: “Our privacy controls give you the power to decide what and how 
much you share. Learn how to manage who can see your information on and off Facebook.” 
Controlling How You Share, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/privacy/ 
explanation.php (last visited Apr. 18, 2011) (providing instructions to limit what information 
is revealed). The popular online auction and shopping company eBay provides a forum for 
merchants and shoppers, where the degree of personal, identifying information is up to the 
user:  
Your User ID is displayed throughout eBay (and so available to the public), and 
is connected to all of your eBay activity. Other people can see your bids, 
purchases, items for sale, storefronts, feedback, ratings and associated 
comments. Notices sent to other community members about suspicious activity 
and policy violations on our sites refer to User IDs and specific items. So if you 
associate your name with your User ID, the people to whom you have revealed 
your name will be able to personally identify your eBay activities.  
Summary of Our Privacy Policies, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/privacy-
policy.html#Activity (last visited Apr. 18, 2011). An interesting observation here and in 
services similar to eBay is that pure anonymity is rarely afforded, and the limited anonymity 
afforded proves contradictory because transactions are preferred with known identities. 
Individuals operate under the guise of pseudonymity, where the “User ID” embodies an 
identity where the “character” of that person is determined by their transactional history. 
PayPal, the popular e-commerce tool advertising itself as “PayPal. Privacy built in,” 
provides users with an option to engage in online financial transactions without revealing 
banking or credit card information. Shop Without Sharing, PAYPAL, 
https://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=xpt/Marketing/general/Shopwoutshare-
outside (last visited Apr. 18, 2011). 
 27. It should be noted that connecting an IP address with an Internet subscriber’s true 
identity is not an easy, automated task. Rather, it places a significant burden on ISPs who 
have limited resources and must prioritize compliance requests, first serving urgent law 
enforcement inquiries such as “suicide threats, child abduction cases, and terrorist activity.” 
Nate Anderson, Turning Numbers into Names: How IP Address Lookups Are Done, ARS 
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Although some may consider the Internet, or niche corners of the Internet, 
to be a modern-day Wild West where the law is so vague as to be either 
exploitable against the weak or ignored altogether, this is not the case.28 
The many activities, communications, and interactions that take place 
within a “virtual” environment are still subject to state, federal, and even 
international laws.29 Accordingly, although anonymity may be expected and 
granted for many online activities, society must retain procedural methods 
to determine the real identities of wrongdoers.30 The question of anonymity 
is therefore necessarily a matter of degree, and there is no consensus as to 
this balance.31 
Proponents of anonymity note the openness that accompanies the ability 
to communicate without the insecurities that often plague people.32 
Proponents argue that anonymous communication allows a “digital 
personae,” which is liberating and has the effect of increasing the quantity 
and quality of discourse and collaboration.33 A likely result, they contend, is 
that discourse “must be judged solely on the[] content as there is literally 
nothing else to go by.”34 The obvious argument against this is that it also 
                                                                                                                           
TECHNICA (Feb. 1, 2011, 6:50 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/02/how-
internet-providers-look-up-an-ip-address.ars.  
 28. See Lyombe Eko, American Exceptionalism, the French Exception, Intellectual 
Property, and Peer-to-Peer File Sharing on the Internet, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 95, 130-34 (2010) (describing “Peer-to-Peer Exchanges as the Wild West of 
American Intellectual Property Enforcement”). 
 29. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2010) (providing a safe harbor from liability to ISPs for 
copyright infringing materials passing through the ISPs network); 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3) 
(2010) (criminalizing trespassing in a federal computer); Seidl v. Greentree Mortg. Co., 30 
F. Supp. 2d 1292 (D. Colo. 1998) (denying attorney’s claim of absolute immunity for 
potentially libelous statements posted on a website); Andrew S. Kaufman & Betsey D. 
Baydala, Redress Cyberbullying as an Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, N.Y. L.J. 
(Feb. 11, 2011), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/ 
PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202481607795 (addressing the viability of trying “cyberbullying” 
claims under the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress); European Data 
Protection Directive, Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) (acknowledging the right 
to privacy and the need to protect personal information from unwanted access and use). 
 30. See Nicoll, supra note 19, at 100. 
 31. DIGITAL ANONYMITY, supra note 6, at 6.  
 32. Id. at 7. 
 33. Id. at 8. Of course, this “digital personae” falls within the paradigm of 
pseudonymity and does not provide pure anonymity. See supra note 26. 
 34. Id.  
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allows for bigotry and hateful speech to go virtually unchecked.35 These 
arguments are especially prominent in cases involving defamation and 
libel.36 Anonymity may also “enhance the individual’s sense of privacy and 
insulate the speaker from unauthorized efforts to probe his persona.”37 
Accordingly, some degree of privacy provides for greater online freedom to 
engage in discourse, disclose personal information, and speak openly 
without fear of retribution.38 
Opponents of unqualified or broadly defined anonymity tend to agree 
with Justice Scalia’s conclusion that it “facilitates wrong by eliminating 
accountability, which is ordinarily the very purpose of anonymity.”39 
Unaccountable use rescinds personal responsibility and permits individuals 
to act without fearing consequences to themselves, others, or society.40 The 
same degree of freedom that permits individuals to feel comfortable 
revealing personal information may also empower individuals to 
communicate lies, lambast others with hateful speech, or transmit unlawful 
content. Accordingly, it is not surprising that claims for anonymous 
protection often arise as a defense.41 Because the right to anonymity is 
presumed as a privacy issue, would-be defendants are hedged behind the 
additional burden placed on the plaintiff to show cause before the law 
                                                                                                                           
 35. See McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 385 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s “perception that ‘anonymous pamphleteering is not a 
pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent.’”) 
(citations omitted). Justice Scalia concluded: “I can imagine no reason why an anonymous 
leaflet is any more honorable, as a general matter, than an anonymous phone call or an 
anonymous letter. It facilitates wrong by eliminating accountability, which is ordinarily the 
very purpose of the anonymity.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 36. See, e.g., Doe v. 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001); 
Immunomedics, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 773 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); Melvin v. Doe, 
836 A.2d 42 (Pa. 2003). 
 37. MADELEINE SCHACHTER & JOEL KURTZBERG, LAW OF INTERNET SPEECH 428-29 (3d 
ed. 2008). 
 38. Id. at 429. 
 39. DIGITAL ANONYMITY, supra note 6, at 7 (quoting McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 385). 
 40. Id. (“Anonymous communication is a great tool for evading detection of many 
varieties of illegal and immoral activity.”). 
 41. See, e.g., Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. 2001) (seeking to identify a 
person who posted defamatory material on an Internet bulletin board); O’Grady v. Superior 
Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (alleging that several anonymous defendants 
leaked confidential information about new Apple Computer products to several websites 
before Apple released the products). 
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permits forced disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s real identity.42 
Because of the structure of the Internet, however, ISPs often find 
themselves in the middle of legal battles as a virtual citadel defending their 
veiled subscribers.43 
B. Copyright Infringement and the Internet 
Anonymity is a key preliminary issue in many types of civil legal 
actions.44 In suits for libel and defamation, malicious “hacking,” fraudulent 
commercial transactions, and intellectual property infringement, litigants 
are often forced to hurdle the identity issue and discover who they wish to 
sue, before reaching the substantive legal cause of action.45 Of the variety 
                                                                                                                           
 42. See, e.g., Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578-79 (N.D. Cal. 
1999).  In Columbia, the court required the plaintiff to overcome the privilege of anonymity 
by demonstrating a prima facie claim, met only by satisfying three requirements: 
  First, the plaintiff should identify the missing party with sufficient 
specificity such that the Court can determine that defendant is a real person or 
entity . . . . 
  . . . . 
  Second, the party should identify all previous steps taken to locate the 
elusive defendant . . . . 
  Third, the plaintiff should establish to the Court’s satisfaction that plaintiff’s 
suit against the defendant could withstand a motion to dismiss. 
Id. See also Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005) (requiring the plaintiff to satisfy the 
“summary judgment” standard before obtaining the identity of an anonymous defendant in a 
defamation case); Best Western Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. CV-06-1537, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
56014 (D. Ariz. July 25, 2006) (permitting the plaintiff to discover the identities of 
individuals who posted comments disparaging Best Western on a website after “considerable 
litigation”). 
 43. Actions brought directly against ISPs are rarely successful unless the ISP has 
engaged in unlawful activity itself. See Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 578 n.1 (noting the 
nature and liability of ISPs, and the difficulty of lawsuits against ISPs for their user’s 
activities). For an interesting analysis of the different treatment ISPs receive in the United 
States versus other countries, see Seagull H. Song, A Comparative Copyright Analysis of ISP 
Liability in China Versus the United States and Europe, 27 THE COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW 
7 (July 2010), available at http://works.bepress.com/seagull_song/2. See also Matthew 
Lasar, ISPs Don’t Want to be Big Content’s “Judges, Juries, and Executioners,” ARS 
TECHNICA (Mar. 16, 2011, 10:45 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/03/ 
aussie-dsl-service-time-to-get-isps-out-of-copyright-enforcement.ars (discussing a proposal 
from iiNet, an Australian ISP, promoting “an alternative to the ISP-as-enforcer model” by 
establishing an independent third party to determine whether evidence provided by the 
plaintiff meets the legal standard before requesting the user’s account information). 
 44. DIGITAL ANONYMITY, supra note 6, at 1. 
 45. See supra note 42. Interestingly, the defendant is not always the only anonymous 
party to a lawsuit. For example, in America Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co. 
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of claims, cases for copyright infringement resulting from unauthorized 
file-sharing has gained considerable notoriety in recent years, due in part to 
the popularity of music and video file-sharing.46 These cases usually 
involve some form of sharing copyrighted materials, such as music, videos, 
or software, without the express authorization of the copyright owner, 
which is a direct infringement of the owner’s copyrights.47 With more than 
2.6 billion files being illegally shared per month, copyright owners’ 
concerns for protecting their property is understandable.48 While some 
derisively characterize the unauthorized sharing of copyrighted content as 
“piracy,”49 others view such sharing as ethical and “an act of respect.”50 
                                                                                                                           
an anonymous plaintiff sought a subpoena duces tecum requiring the ISP to disclose the 
identities of anonymous John Doe defendants who allegedly defamed and shared 
confidential information in Internet chat rooms. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America 
Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000), rev’d sub nom America Online, Inc. v. 
Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001). AOL, the ISP to several of the 
defendants, moved to squash the subpoena, but the trial court refused the motion. AOL 
appealed, and the Virginia Supreme Court reversed, requiring the anonymous plaintiff to 
reveal his or her identity before continuing with the case. Anonymity is not only an issue in 
civil cases, but also poses hurdles in criminal cases. See also Indira Carr, Anonymity, the 
Internet and Criminal Law Issues, in DIGITAL ANONYMITY, supra note 6, at 189-97 (noting 
the problems UK law enforcement face when gathering evidence for prosecution of criminal 
acts such as child pornography). 
 46. HART, supra note 7, at 233. 
 47. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2010) (affording copyright protection to “original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression”); 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2010) 
(extending copyright protection to cover digital work, and prohibiting circumvention of 
digital copyright protection technologies). 
 48. Music United for Strong Internet Copyright, Online Music Sharing is Wrong, 
reprinted in INTERNET PIRACY 8 (James D. Torr, ed., Thomson Gale 2005). 
 49. “Some” may be an understatement, considering the FBI has adopted the term. Anti-
Piracy Warning Seal, FBI, available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/investigate/cyber/ipr/anti-piracy (last visited Apr. 18, 2011). See also HART, supra note 7, 
at 263 (noting that in March 2004, Congress introduced, but failed to pass, a bill entitled The 
Protecting Intellectual Rights Against Theft and Expropriation Act of 2004 (the “PIRATE 
Act”), S. 2237, 108th Cong. (2004)) (permitting “the Department of Justice to bring a civil 
action against suspected copyright infringers”). The file-sharing community has also proudly 
claimed the ‘pirate’ epithet. See, e.g., THE PIRATE BAY, http://thepiratebay.org/ (last visited 
Apr. 18, 2011). The Pirate Bay is a file-sharing site started and maintained by a Swedish 
anti-copyright organization. As an interesting side note, not everyone views the act of 
pirating copyrighted material as wrong. See Anthony G. Gorry, Many People Do Not View 
Online Music Sharing as Wrong, reprinted in INTERNET PIRACY, supra note 48, at 22. 
 50. See Enigmax, File-Sharers Await Official Recognition of New Religion, TORRENT 
FREAK (Apr. 18, 2011), http://torrentfreak.com/file-sharers-await-official-recognition-of-
new-religion-110410/. 
552 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:541 
 
 
Accordingly, for those opposed to file-sharing, Internet piracy is viewed as 
a dangerous and destructive activity, while proponents of file-sharing 
celebrate it as beneficial to the artistic community at large.51 
The merits of the various policy arguments on either side of the debate 
are beyond the scope of this Comment. There is generally no dispute over 
whether a copyright is infringed when an individual shares or receives 
unauthorized copyrighted material from another person in the United 
States.52 The Copyright Act of 1976 provides protected ownership rights to 
“original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression.”53 This protection is as applicable to digital works as it is to 
physical works.54 However, U.S. copyright protection only extends so far. 
The transnational nature of the Internet exposes artists’ work to foreign 
countries and laws, and opens the door for a vast array of opinions and 
arguments regarding the use and nature of shared content.55 As one author 
notes, while copyright law is well developed in the United States, “nine-
tenths of the people on the planet are from cultures or political systems that 
don’t have a concept of or laws regarding intellectual property—in fact, 
many don’t recognize individual property ownership.”56 This fact may 
account for the diversity of ideologies surrounding the file-sharing debate, 
but it does not negate or address the simple fact that many people own 
                                                                                                                           
 51. See Bonnie J.K. Richardson, The Government Must Combat Online Piracy, 
reprinted in INTERNET PIRACY, supra note 48, at 49 (testifying before the House 
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection that “Internet piracy is the 
single biggest impediment to digital trade today.”). But see Hal Plotkin, Online File Sharing 
Will Benefit Society, reprinted in INTERNET PIRACY, supra note 48, at 66 (envisioning the 
positive transformation of “a new, sharing world”). 
 52. Copyright infringement is in no way confined within the boundaries of the United 
States. The International Intellectual Property Alliance, a “private sector coalition [of trade 
associations] represent the U.S. copy-right based industries,” in a recent report to the Office 
of U.S. Trade Representatives noted that “[t]heft of U.S. [c]reative [c]ontent is a [g]lobal 
[p]roblem.” Letter from Eric H. Smith, Int’l Intellectual Prop. Alliance, to Stanford McCoy, 
Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Int’l Prop. and Innovation (Feb. 17, 2009), available 
at http://www.iipa.com/2009_SPEC301_TOC.htm (follow “IIPA’s Eric H. Smith Letter to 
Stan McCoy, Assistant United States Trade Representative”) (last visited May 1, 2011). See 
also International Intellectual Property Alliance 2011 Special 301 Report, INT’L 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALLIANCE, http://www.iipa.com/2011_SPEC301_TOC.htm (last visited 
May 1, 2011) (listing countries in order of priority for copyright violating activities). 
 53. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2010). 
 54. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(C) (2000). 
 55. See International Intellectual Property Alliance, supra note 52. 
 56. JOHN GANTZ & JACK B. ROCHESTER, PIRATES OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM 5 
(Financial Times Prentice Hall 2005). 
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copyrights and intellectual property that are unlawfully shared across the 
Internet.57 
People share media over the Internet through various file-sharing 
methods, including “hosted” and “peer-to-peer” (P2P) protocols.58 While 
the content shared across these networks remains the same, the methods of 
storing, serving, and sharing the content have several unique legal 
implications.59 There is an important distinction between “hosted” and 
“P2P” file-sharing. Hosted file-sharing involves a centralized server where 
files are stored and available for download and distribution.60 The popular 
file-sharing software Napster operated as a hosted file-sharing network 
prior to its legal challenges,61 and it continues to operate as a legitimate 
form of centralized file-sharing today.62 The shutdown of Napster, while a 
                                                                                                                           
 57. MITCH BAINWOL, THE MUSIC INDUSTRY’S LAWSUITS AGAINST ONLINE MUSIC 
SHARERS ARE JUSTIFIED (2003), reprinted in INTERNET PIRACY 52 (James D. Torr, ed., 
Thomson Gale 2005). 
 58. Peer-to-peer file-sharing is a somewhat technically complicated procedure, but has 
been defined as where “the participants share a part of their own hardware resources 
(processing power, storage capacity, network link capacity, printers). These shared resources 
are necessary to provide the Service and content offered by the network (e.g. file-sharing or 
shared workspaces for collaboration). They are accessible by other peers.” Glossary of Peer-
to-Peer Terminology, P2P NETWORKING AND APPLICATIONS, http://www.p2pna.com/ 
glossary.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2011). See also GANTZ, supra note 56, at 179-82 
(providing “An Anatomy of Downloading” through the popular KaZaA protocol). 
 59. As the culture of file-sharing continues to develop, so does the method of sharing. 
Hosted file-sharing was popular prior to the takedown of Napster, and P2P rose to take its 
place. However, now that P2P has fallen under close scrutiny, Usenet, a form of centralized, 
hosted file-sharing, and “direct http” downloads from “file lockers” are becoming more 
popular in the file-sharing culture. See How to Use Usenet, a Beginners Guide, 
TORRENTFREAK (Apr. 4, 2007), http://torrentfreak.com/how-to-use-usenet-a-beginners-
guide; TEHPARADOX.COM, http://tehparadox.com/ (last visited May 1, 2011) (providing 
users with forums to share links to files on paid servers known as “file lockers” such as 
http://www.fileserve.com and http://www.megaupload).  
 60. See, e.g., MEGAUPLOAD, http://www.megaupload.com (last visited May 1, 2011); 
RAPIDSHARE, http://www.rapidshare.com (last visited May 1, 2011); FILESERVE, 
http://www.fileserve.com (last visited May 1, 2011). 
 61. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (2000). The RIAA 
filed suit against Napster for contributory and vicarious copyright infringement and was 
awarded an injunction against Napster, enjoining Napster from “engaging in, or facilitating 
others in copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting, or distributing plaintiffs’ 
copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings, protected by either federal or state 
law, without express permission of the rights owner.” Id. at 927. 
 62. ANDREW A. ADAMS & RACHEL MCCRINDLE, PANDORA’S BOX: SOCIAL AND 
PROFESSIONAL ISSUES OF THE INFORMATION AGE 433 (2008).  
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victory for copyright owners, forced the Internet culture to adopt a 
decentralized form of file-sharing in an attempt to avoid legal 
complications.63 P2P file-sharing succeeded as a plausible alternative to 
centralized file-sharing and has proven more complicated and difficult to 
litigate—as this type of technology allows users to connect directly to each 
other without a mediating third party vulnerable to DMCA takedown 
regulations.64 Among the many forms of P2P communication protocols, 
BitTorrent is arguably the most popular, and has been the subject of several 
highly publicized copyright infringement cases.65 
C. Congress’s Response to Developing Technologies: The Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act 
In response to the copyright issues arising as result of the emerging 
popularity of file-sharing, Congress enacted the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) in 1998.66 This Act effectively ratified two treaties 
of the World Intellectual Property Organization,67 criminalizing the 
development and use of technologies commonly used to pirate copyrighted 
works and, at the same time, limiting the liability of service providers.68 
                                                                                                                           
 63. See Emily Elias, BitTorrent Keeps File-Sharing Going Strong, STRAIGHT.COM (Jan. 
27, 2011), http://www.straight.com/article-370564/vancouver/bittorrent-keeps-filesharing-
going-strong (“With any file-sharing site you try to shut down, a new file-sharing site is 
bound to pop up, and that has happened in the past—with Napster, then Kazaa. . . . There is 
no way you can shut file-sharing down.”).  
 64. This is a matter of technicality, as the ISP is still the one providing access to the 
Internet.  
 65. The BitTorrent P2P protocol is especially useful in distributing and transferring 
larger files across the Internet. What is BitTorrent?, BITTORRENT, 
http://www.bittorrent.com/btusers/what-is-bittorrent (last visited May 1, 2011).  
 66. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 67. WIPO, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/wipo (last visited May 
1, 2011) (“The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is the UN agency 
responsible for treaties involving copyright, patent, and trademark laws.”). While WIPO was 
key in laying ground for international intellectual property policy, other groups, such as the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership, continue to push for the expansion of trade agreements addressing 
copyright protection. See Nate Anderson, Son of ACTA: Meet the Next Secret Copyright 
Treaty, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 11, 2011 11:20 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2011/03/son-of-acta-meet-the-next-secret-copyright-treaty.ars (discussing the 
“Trans-Pacific Partnership,” and the “secret” intellectual property chapter drafted by the 
United States that was leaked on March 10, 2011 and quoting Michael Gist, Canadian law 
professor, describing the chapter as “everything [the US] wanted in ACTA but didn’t get.”).  
 68. H.R. REP. No. 105-551(I), at 9 (1998). 
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The DMCA acknowledged the unique relationship an ISP has with both its 
customers and copyright owners whose property may be transmitted 
through its systems and networks.69 In essence, Congress was 
acknowledging the unprecedented role that ISPs play in providing a unique 
service to individuals. One of the key measures the DMCA adopted was to 
differentiate between “direct infringement” and “secondary liability.”70 
Direct infringement is assessed against those principally involved in the 
copyright infringing activity, while secondary liability attaches to “passive, 
automatic acts engaged in through a technological process initiated by 
another.”71 By creating this dichotomy, Congress intended to encourage 
cooperation between those attempting to enforce their copyright and those 
in the position to “prevent ongoing infringement.”72 
Despite the thorough scope of the DMCA and the considerable number 
of amendments,73 several of its inherent flaws create severe enforcement 
difficulties. The DMCA is weakened by two key errors: first, the DMCA 
overextends ISP immunity and fails to provide adequate measures for 
subpoena process;74 and second, the DMCA fails to address and define 
requisite boundaries for anonymity and identification of end-users. 
Together, these missteps limit the applicability of the DMCA by failing to 
provide an adequate process for copyright owners to identify a substantial 
class of purported infringers. 
The DMCA’s broad exemption of ISP liability and the limitation on 
subpoena power severely misunderstands the structure and nature of ISP-
end user relationships. Title II of the DMCA affords ISPs immunity from 
                                                                                                                           
 69. Id. at 11. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. 
 72. Katherine Raynolds, Comment, Note: One Verizon, Two Verizon, Three Verizon, 
More?—A Comment: RIAA v. Verizon and How the DMCA Subpoena Power Became 
Powerless, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 343, 349 (2005). 
 73. The Act has been amended thirty-two times since its creation. See 7 MELVILLE B. 
NIMMER AND DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT App. 2-1 (Matthew Bender rev. ed., 
2009). 
 74. This Comment does not suggest that the subpoena power should be more lenient to 
litigants, but rather that the procedures are inadequately defined and based on outdated 
policy considerations, at one time providing litigants an opportunity to misue the DMCA to 
gain easy access to defendants while ultimately becoming useless. See No Downtime for 
Free Speech Campaign, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, http://www.eff.org/issues/ip-
and-free-speech (last visited July 2, 2011); Reynolds, supra note 72, at 349. 
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monetary and injunctive relief under four explicit conditions.75 First, ISPs 
cannot be liable for “transmitting, routing, or providing connections for 
material through a system or network controlled or operated by or for the 
service provider” so long as the material meets a set of criteria and, upon 
notice, “the ISP follows certain ‘notice and take down’ procedures.”76 
Second, the “intermediate and temporary storage” of copyrighted material 
does not create ISP liability per se.77 Third, even material residing on the 
ISP’s system or controlled network will not create liability so long as the 
ISP lacked knowledge of it and received no financial benefit from it.78 
Finally, an ISP will not be liable for “referring or linking” to infringing 
material through “information location tools, including a directory, index, 
reference, pointer, or hypertext link.”79 A key characteristic of all of these 
exemptions is that the ISP does not actively promote the unlawful activity, 
and upon notice of such activity, takes active steps to stop the infringement. 
Once the infringing activity is recognized, a copyright owner may 
subpoena the ISP to identify the user.80 Often a third party will monitor a 
shared file, harvesting and recording the IP address of those participating in 
the “swarm” as each connected user can see the IP address of others.81 
Attorneys representing copyright holders will then present the list of IP 
addresses to a court in the complaint and seek to discover the associated 
identities from the ISP.82 This is the procedure that has come under the 
                                                                                                                           
 75. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 
1234 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 76. Raynolds, supra note 72, at 349. See also 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (2000). In 
general, the ISP must play a passive role and cannot store information on its hardware. 
 77. 17 U.S.C. § 512(b) (2000). 
 78. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2000). 
 79. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (2000). 
 80. Nate Anderson, Turning Numbers into Names: How IP Addresses Lookups Are 
Done, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 1, 2011, 6:50 AM) (describing the subpoena process in 
Achte/Neunte Boll Kino Beteiligungs Gmbh & Co. v. Does 1-4,577, 736 F. Supp. 2d 212, 
213 (D.D.C. 2010)). 
 81. Enigmax, Hustler Hires Media Protector to Chase Online Porn Pirates, 
TORRENTFREAK (Jan. 3, 2009), http://torrentfreak.com/hustler-hires-media-protector-to-
chase-porn-pirates-090103/. As an example of this type of information gathering, in Call of 
the Wild the plaintiffs enlisted Guardaley Limited, “an anti-piracy firm that uses proprietary 
technology to identify BitTorrent users sharing the plaintiff’s copyrighted works.” Call of 
the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-1,062, CIV.A. 10-455 BAH, 2011 WL 996786 (D.D.C. 
Mar. 22, 2011). 
 82. For an excellent example of a list of IP addresses presented to a court, see Exhibit C 
to Motion for Leave for Discovery (Hurt Locker), Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does 1 – 5,000, 
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greatest degree of scrutiny and where much of the controversy begins. 
Section 512(h) of the DMCA provides the copyright owner with the 
subpoena power necessary to identify the infringer, so long as he provides 
the information listed under subsection (c)(3)(A).83 Although the language 
in this section is clear, simple, and straightforward, the demand for the 
requisite information of the infringing user has raised serious privacy 
concerns.84 In theory, the DMCA allows a copyright owner to discover the 
identity of an individual with only a preliminary prima facie showing of a 
potential legal cause.85 However, it may be the case that the language is so 
simple that it has crippled the effectiveness of the DMCA. 
Although one of the primary purposes of the DMCA is to provide 
copyright owners with procedures to protect their property by identifying 
purported infringers, the DMCA offers very little guidance for determining 
when subpoenas should be granted.86 Congress has ultimately left this 
decision to the courts, and a variety of inquiries and tests have been 
established attempting to ascertain when an ISP falls under the purview of 
the DMCA.87 This is a somewhat technical undertaking and requires an 
understanding of ISP’s technical functions and their relationships with 
subscribers. 
In the hallmark DMCA case of RIAA v. Verizon, the Second Circuit 
noted the inherent failure of the DMCA to accommodate the popular P2P 
file-sharing technology.88 Here, the RIAA believed a subscriber of the ISP 
Verizon was engaging in copyright infringement by sharing music through 
                                                                                                                           
Civ. A. No. 1:10-cv-00873-RMU, available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/32726320/Volt-
Pict-2573095-3-3943 (last visited May 1, 2003).  
 83. 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(h), (c)(3)(A) (2000) (requiring that the copyright owner, along 
with his own contact information and proof of copyright ownership, must provide, 
“Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of 
infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and 
information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material”). 
 84. Patrick Fogarty, Major Record Labels and the RIAA: Dinosaurs in a Digital Age?, 9 
HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 140, 152 (2008). 
 85. Id. 
 86. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) (2000) (requiring “information reasonably sufficient to 
permit the service provider to locate the material” but not providing any further guidelines 
and leaving what constitutes “information reasonably sufficient” to the discretion of the 
clerk). 
 87. See, e.g., Fogarty, supra note 84, at 154 (discussing several factors courts have 
determined when granting subpoenas). 
 88. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 
1234 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
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a P2P program, and served Verizon with a subpoena seeking to identify the 
purported infringer.89 Verizon refused, and the District Court granted the 
RIAA’s motion to compel discovery.90 Verizon appealed, and the Second 
Circuit reversed, noting that the “information” required for the subpoena 
must indicate activity described under § 512(a)–(d).91 The Second Circuit 
interpreted this to mean that the subpoena power is “structurally linked to 
the storage function of an ISP, not the transmission function.”92 
Additionally, the Second Circuit noted that the legislative history of the 
DMCA indicated that Congress was unaware that users would be able to 
“directly . . . exchange files containing copyrighted works.”93 In fact, this 
has become a “widely popular” form of sharing for both music and video 
files.94 Consequently, the DMCA is inapplicable when users directly 
interact with one another and the ISP is passive and merely providing 
access to the networks over which it has little or no control.95 
D. Case in Point: RIAA and John Doe Litigation 
After a series of futile DMCA litigation attempts,96 the RIAA began 
initiating John Doe lawsuits.97 In these cases, the RIAA files a complaint 
identifying the anonymous defendants only by their “numerical IP 
address.”98 The RIAA then files ex parte expedited discovery requests to 
                                                                                                                           
 89. Id. at 1231. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 92. Fogarty, supra note 84, at 154 (citing Verizon, 351 F.3d at 1237). 
 93. Verizon, 351 F.3d at 1238. 
 94. See HART, supra note 7, at 233. 
 95. See, e.g., Verizon, 351 F.3d 1229 (holding that the DMCA only permits the issuance 
of subpoenas when an ISP engages in hosting copyright infringing materials on its servers, 
and the not when the ISP is “acting as a conduit for P2P file-sharing”) (emphasis added); In 
re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 393 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2005); In re Subpoena to Univ. of N.C. at 
Chapel Hill, 367 F. Supp. 2d 945, 952 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (applying the same “act[ing] as a 
conduit” rationale in determining that the DMCA does not apply to universities acting as 
ISPs). 
 96. See, e.g., Verizon, 351 F.3d 1229, In re Charter, 393 F.3d 771; In re Subpoena to 
University of North Carolina, 367 F. Supp 2d 945. 
 97. Fogarty, supra note 84, at 156. 
 98. Id.  
2011] DISPELLING THE INTERNET’S RING OF GYGES MYTH 559 
 
 
subpoena the ISP “to determine the true identities of Doe Defendants.”99 If 
the court grants the request, the ISP is served with the subpoena demanding 
disclosure of “the name, current (and permanent) addresses and telephone 
numbers, email addresses, and Media Access Control for each 
Defendant.”100 At this point the ISP may then communicate a letter to the 
Does “indicating that an order has already been granted against them.”101 If 
and when the subpoena provides the names and addresses of the 
subscribers, the RIAA will drop the John Doe case and file a new suit 
against the defendant in his real name.102 
                                                                                                                           
 99. See, e.g., Ex Parte Application For Leave to Take Immediate Discovery at 2, Arista 
Records LLC v. Does 1-22, No 8 Civ. 00066-S-DLM (D. R.I. filed Feb. 27, 2008) available 
at http://www.ilrweb.com/viewILRPDF.asp?filename=arista_does1-22_080228Motion. 
 100. Id. Fogarty, supra note 84, at 156 (noting that these have been routinely granted). 
MAC addresses are unique identifiers assigned to most network adapters or network 
interface cards, consisting of both letters and numbers. PAWAN K. BHARDWAJ, A+, 
NETWORK+, SECURITY+ EXAMS IN A NUTSHELL: A DESKTOP QUICK REFERENCE (2007). There 
are three key differences between IP addresses and MAC address that make MAC addresses 
less reliable for the purposes of identification. First, MAC addresses are usually encoded in 
the physical hardware of a device, while the ISP assigns IP addresses to the end-users. 
DANIEL STEINBERG AND STUART CHESHIRE, ZERO CONFIGURATION NETWORKING: THE 
DEFINITIVE GUIDE 24 (2005). The benefit of the MAC address is that it will remain the same 
even if the user uses different service providers. For example, if an individual accesses the 
Internet at a café offering WiFi, and hours later returns home and uses his personal WiFi 
there, his MAC address will remain the same, while his IP address will have changed. 
Second, although this is intended to be a permanent assignment, it is possible to change the 
MAC address—known as “spoofing” the address. ANDREW LOCKHART, NETWORK SECURITY 
HACKS 67 (2004); MATTHEW GAST, 802.11 WIRELESS NETWORKS: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE 
480 (2d, 2005). Therefore, while the assignment of the static MAC address is beneficial 
when one moves between ISPs, it is also less-beneficial in that a knowledgeable computer 
user is able to continually change his MAC address at whim. Finally, MAC addresses are 
difficult to track geographically as they will only reveal the identity of the manufacturer and 
hardware device, while IP addresses may provide more information as to the location of the 
device on the network itself. 
 101. Beckerman, supra note 12. 
 102. See also Denise Howell, P2P. . . You And Me, THIS WEEK IN LAW (Apr. 26, 2009), 
http://www.podtrac.com/pts/redirect.mp3/twit.cachefly.net/TWiL-023.mp3 (interviewing 
Ray Beckerman, who is heavily involved in RIAA litigation and noting that RIAA will 
occasionally also add the real identity of the individual to the John Doe suit as a third party 
without dropping the original suit). This Comment assumes, for the sake of argument, that 
these are legitimate procedures that copyright owners necessarily follow in a good faith 
attempt to enforce their copyright, but there are strong arguments against this presumption. 
See Nate Anderson, Judge: P2P Class-Action Suit Looks Like a “Fishing Expedition,” ARS 
TECHNICA (Mar. 10, 2011 11:43 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/03/ 
judge-p2p-class-action-suit-looks-like-a-fishing-expedition.ars.  
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A notable and controversial result of this litigation method is that for the 
first stages of the suit, the actual defendants are not on notice of pending 
litigation and are without representation.103 This has been decried as an 
unlawful and unethical approach to litigate Internet copyright infringement 
cases.104 Courts have looked with disfavor on this John Doe procedure, 
noting, “in several important ways[,] they are less protective of the rights of 
service providers and Internet users [than in DMCA litigation].”105 Yet, 
without adequate measures to uncover the identity of infringers, the RIAA 
and similar copyright owners are without alternative procedures to enforce 
their ownership rights. 
There are several additional drawbacks to John Doe litigation; the 
process is expensive, time-consuming, and often ends before the merits of 
the case are even considered.106 While broadband-speed Internet access is 
beneficial for those who wish to access or share files, the length of time 
required to request and receive a subpoena often undermines the ability of 
copyright owners to prevent further infringement.107  
III.  THE PROBLEM IN FOCUS: ARISTA RECORDS V. DOES 1-16 
The recent Second Circuit case of Arista Records v. Does 1-16108 offers 
an excellent example of the issues raised in the John Doe genus of RIAA 
litigation.109 As in similar cases,110 a key issue from the outset was the 
degree of anonymity constitutionally afforded to the defendants. Here, 
Arista Records LLC, along with twelve other music recording and 
entertainment companies (collectively Arista), brought suit for copyright 
                                                                                                                           
 103. See Beckerman, supra note 12. 
 104. Fogarty, supra note 84, at 156 (citing Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Verizon 
Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). 
 105. In re Verizon Internet Servs., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 40 (D.D.C. 2003) (ordering 
subpoena enforcement). 
 106. See Alex Salkever, Big Music’s Worst Move Yet, BUSINESS WEEK (Jan. 27, 2004), 
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jan2004/tc20040127_2819_tc047.htm. 
 107. Raynolds, supra note 72, at 372. 
 108. Arista Records LLC v. Does 1-16, 2009 WL 414060 (N.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d sub 
nom. Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2010) 
 109. For a collection of similar cases, see INDEX OF LITIGATION DOCUMENTS REFERRED 
TO IN “RECORD INDUSTRY VS. THE PEOPLE,” http://beckermanlegal.com/Documents.htm (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2011) (containing a detailed archive of many documents relating to RIAA 
litigation) and RIAA V. THE PEOPLE CASE ARCHIVE, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, 
http://w2.eff.org/IP/P2P/riaa_archive.php (last visited Apr. 14, 2009) (indexing cases where 
the EFF filed amicus briefs). 
 110. Id. 
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infringement against sixteen anonymous defendants, known only by their IP 
address.111 Arista claimed the Defendants violated copyright law by the 
“downloading and distributi[ng] of copyrighted sound recordings owned by 
Plaintiffs.”112 The thirteen defendants were unrelated, except for the fact 
that they all used the Internet services provided by the State University of 
New York (SUNY).113 
After commencing the suit, Arista filed an ex parte motion for leave to 
take immediate discovery in order to identify the Doe Defendants.114 The 
trial court granted the motion and issued a subpoena upon SUNY, “seeking 
documents, including electronically stored information, sufficient to 
identify each Defendant’s true name, current (and permanent) addresses and 
telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, and Media Access Control (MAC) 
addresses.115 Defendants motioned to quash the subpoena, raising three 
primary arguments. First, defendants claimed that Arista’s complaint was 
“insufficient to defeat their first amendment privilege to be anonymous.”116 
Second, defendants claimed that Arista’s complaint was “solely predicated 
on illegally obtained evidence.”117 Finally, defendants argued that “[t]he 
joinder of all defendants in one action is improper.”118  
The defendants’ first claim is of particular interest to this Comment. The 
right “to use the Internet . . . anonymously,” they contended, is a qualified 
                                                                                                                           
 111. Id. 
 112. Complaint at ¶ 18, Arista Records LLC v. Does 1-16, 2008 WL 4337339 (N.D.N.Y. 
2008). 
 113. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Quash, Arista Records LLC v. Does 
1-16, 2008 WL 5368436 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 1:08-cv-00765-NPM RFT). 
 114. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 3, Arista Records LLC v. Doe 3, 2009 WL 414060 
(N.D.N.Y 2009). 
 115. Memorandum of Law in Support of Ex Parte Application for Leave to Take 
Immediate Discovery at 3, Arista Records LLC v. Does 1-22, 2008 WL 5368436 (N.D.N.Y. 
2008) (No. 1:08-cv-00765-NPM RFT). The Family Education Rights and Privacy Act 20 
U.S.C. § 1232g (1974) requires that schools must obtain the permission of the student before 
releasing “educational records” to an inquiring party. The act broadly defines student records 
as, “those records, files, documents, and other materials which . . . . contain information 
directly related to a student.” Id. at § 1232g (4)(A)(4). Whether or not providing information 
of the student’s identity to the inquiring party would violate this act is beyond the scope of 
this Comment but warrants further consideration. 
 116. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Quash, Arista Records LLC v. Does 
1-16, 2008 WL 5368436 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 1:08-cv-00765-NPM RFT). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
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privilege afforded by the First Amendment.119 Building off the “well 
established” understanding that “the First Amendment protects the right to 
speak anonymously,” the defendants next merge the terms “speech” and 
“communicate,” and argue that “First Amendment rights are fully 
applicable to communications over the internet.”120 This allows their 
deduction that any communications over the Internet, including copyright 
infringement, are protected under the “essential constitutional privilege” of 
the First Amendment.121 
The District Court agreed that the “First Amendment protection extends 
to expression on the Internet.”122 The court admitted that, while the First 
Amendment affords a degree of protection to “anonymous expressions by 
an Internet user,” the “expectation of privacy is limited” because 
“expression qualifies as speech only to a finite degree.”123 The court 
reasoned that although the First Amendment is not a “safe haven for 
copyright infringement,”124 it does afford an “exceedingly small” privacy 
interest.125 This “minimally protected constitutional right” of the alleged 
infringer, the court noted, must be weighed against the interest of a 
copyright owner. Refusing the discovery order, the court observed, would 
have an irreparable effect on the Plaintiffs’ interests: “Without [the ISP] 
making available its list of allocated IP addresses to individual students so 
that a culprit of copyright infringement may be traced, Plaintiffs would be 
forever stymied in their efforts to protect their property rights and to bring 
an action against those alleged wrongdoers.”126 The court then concluded 
that the defendants’ right to anonymity must “yield” to the Plaintiffs’ 
interest in the information necessary to pursue their claims, and denied 
Defendants’ motion to quash the subpoena.127 
                                                                                                                           
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Arista Records v. Does 1-16, 2009 WL 414060, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (emphasis 
added). 
 123. Id. (emphasis added). 
 124. Id. (citing In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 260 (D.D.C., 
2003)). 
 125. Id.  
 126. Id. at *6. 
 127. Id. 
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The Defendants appealed the District Court’s denial to the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, where the decision awaits review.128 The 
Defendants raised the same three primary defenses as they did before the 
District Court.129 In support of their First Amendment argument, 
Defendants claimed, “downloading, distributing, or making music available 
constitutes protected First Amendment speech.”130 Defendants claimed that 
this presumption affords them a “qualified privilege” to “communicate 
anonymously” that must be weighed against the Plaintiffs’ interest in 
enforcing their copyrights.131 
Plaintiffs respond by denying that the First Amendment affords any 
privilege to the type of activity at issue in the case.132 Although there was a 
split in authority, Plaintiffs urged the Appellate Court to adopt the 
following rationale: “[m]any courts [who have] held that the act of 
infringing copyrights by downloading and distributing copyrighted works 
over a P2P network is not speech warranting First Amendment 
protection.”133 Without First Amendment protection, Plaintiffs argue the 
Defendants should have no expectation to any legally guaranteed 
anonymity.134 
Three important issues were raised in this case. First, whether the Second 
Circuit agrees with the Plaintiffs or Defendants, Internet users assume a 
general, but prevalent, presumption of online anonymity that requires 
judicial action to overcome.135 This is in large part due to the use of IP 
addresses and the lack of any corresponding directory or established 
                                                                                                                           
 128. Arista Records LLC, v. Doe 3, 2009 WL 414060 (N.D.N.Y. 2009), appeal docketed, 
No. 09-0905-cv (2nd Cir. Apr. 22, 2009). 
 129. See supra text accompanying notes 116-18. 
 130. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 20, Arista Records LLC, v. Doe 3, 2009 WL 
414060 (N.D.N.Y. 2009), appeal docketed, No. 09-0905-cv (2nd Cir. Apr. 22, 2009) (citing 
Sony Music Ent. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Fonovisa, Inc. v. 
Does 1-9, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27170 at *29 (W.D.Pa. Apr. 3, 2008)). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 16, Arista Records LLC, v. Doe 3, 2009 WL 414060 
(N.D.N.Y. 2009), appeal docketed, No. 09-0905-cv (2nd Cir. Apr. 22, 2009). 
 133. Id. at 17. 
 134. Id. at 18. 
 135. This assertion is clearly supported by the current procedural requirements in any 
John Doe action: the identity of the anonymous user may only be demanded and discovered 
through subpoenas. See HART, supra note 7, at 33-42 (discussing how courts have treated 
John Doe cases and the requirements to subpoena necessary information to continue the 
suit). 
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procedures to discover the true identity.136 Second, the ISP is presumed to 
be the protector of its end-user’s identity and to have an obligation to refuse 
any inquiries unless accompanied by a court ordered subpoena.137 Finally, 
the degree to which a person is afforded anonymity is directly correlative 
with their online activities at dispute in the controversy.138 
A. Presumption of Anonymity 
First, the presumption must be reassessed and defined in terms that shift 
the burden to ensure anonymity from the ISPs to the end-users. The 
presumption of anonymity finds its roots in the First Amendment, with the 
relevant part requiring, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech . . . .”139 While a right to anonymity has been, or has 
attempted to be, extended to various types of activities, it originally applied 
squarely to “speech.”140 One such form of speech protected by the First 
Amendment is anonymous speech, which has recently been extended to 
anonymous speech on the Internet.141 The migration and engrafting of 
anonymity to Internet communications has largely been the result of two 
                                                                                                                           
 136. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. 
 137. ISPs have a unique role as the gatekeeper to the anonymous users identities because 
it alone assigns each subscriber an IP addresses, and retains the logs and information that 
show which subscriber was assigned a particular address at a given time. While copyright 
owners have utilized services to discover the IP addresses of users who have unlawfully 
shared copyrighted files, they are unable to continue litigating their claim until the numerical 
IP address is translated into identifying information. See Press Release, RIAA, New Wave of 
Record Industry Lawsuits Brought Against 532 Illegal File Sharers (Jan. 21, 2004), 
available at http://www.riaa.com/newsitem.php?id=7A2318DB-1A51-7911-AB93-
54D8337A9B90 (last visited Dec. 23, 2009). 
 138. For example, the First Amendment protects anonymity if the case “involve[es] core 
First Amendment expression.” In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., Subpoena Enforcement 
Matter, Recording Indus. Ass’n of America v. Verizon Internet Servs., Civil Action No. 03-
MS-0040, 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 259 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 139. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) 
(holding that Ohio’s statutory prohibition against distributing anonymous campaign 
literature violated the First Amendment). 
 140. See Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1092 (W.D. Wash. 2001) 
(noting that “The right to speak anonymously was of fundamental importance to the 
establishment of our Constitution”). 
 141. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1995) (reviewing First Amendment Supreme 
Court jurisprudence and noting that “our cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of 
First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to [the Internet].”); accord, Sinclair v. 
TubeSockTedD, 596 F. Supp. 2d 128, 131 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Such rights to speak 
anonymously apply . . . to speech on the Internet.”) 
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factors. First, the Internet is architecturally supported by systems that, as a 
matter of technical design and efficiency, allow free access and use of the 
Internet, across a variety of mediums.142 Moreover, because it is common 
practice for ISPs to randomly assign IP addresses to the user with each 
distinct connection (this type of IP address is called a dynamic address) and 
only may store identifying information within their system logs, an 
individual may communicate under different IP addresses several times a 
day.143 Accordingly, matching the user with their online activity is usually 
only possible with the help of the ISP, help that must usually be compelled 
through judicial procedures.144 Even assigning fixed IP addresses (static 
addresses) limits knowledge of the real identity of the end-user to the 
ISP,145 since there is currently no public register or directory that matches 
IP addresses to users.146 Second, the Internet provides users with “the 
                                                                                                                           
 142. NICOLL, supra note 19, at 102-05. Almost fourteen years ago the Supreme Court 
observed how the Internet “provides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for 
communication of all kinds.” The Court further noted: 
This dynamic, multifaceted category of communication includes not only 
traditional print and news services, but also audio, video, and still images, as 
well as interactive, real-time dialogue. Through the use of chat rooms, any 
person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates 
farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail 
exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer. 
Reno, 521 U.S. at 870. 
 143. NICOLL, supra note 19, at 102. 
 144. In Call of the Wild, Time Warner and supporting Amici did not “dispute that the 
plaintiffs have no other sources for the information they seek.” No. 10-455 BAH, at 25. See 
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION 
AGE 205 (2004) (noting “an ISP often holds the key to one’s ability to communicate 
anonymously on the Internet).  
 145. Static addresses provide a significant advantage over dynamic addresses for 
purposes of discovering the identity of an individual, but, under the most widely-used IPv4 
framework, static addresses are uncommon and inefficient for most consumer usage. See K. 
Hubbard et al., Internet Registry IP Allocation Guidelines 6 (Network Working Group, 
Internet Engineering Steering Group, Request For Comments No. 2050, Nov. 1996), 
available at http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc2050.txt.pdf. 
 146. The plausibility of an Internet “white pages” or “yellow pages” is currently 
untenable because such a registry would require static addressing. The majority of the 
Internet currently relies on IPv4 for address assignment. This protocol allocates 32-bit IP 
address, which limits the number of possible devices attached to the Internet to 232. This 
makes it impossible to universally assign dynamic addresses, and, accordingly, ISPs rely 
heavily on dynamically assigning addresses to accommodate subscribers. However, with the 
number of devices accessing the Internet increasing daily, the number of IP addresses will 
eventually be exhausted under IPv4, so individuals and network administrators will soon be 
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greatest choice in what identity pointers . . . to reveal.”147 Functionally, this 
allows individuals who are at first identifiable only by their numerical IP 
address to choose what additional information to disclose.148 
B.  The Unique Position of ISP as Gateway to the End-Users 
The second observation, and one closely related to the first, is that ISPs 
are placed de facto in a unique position as the guardian and caretaker of its 
subscribers’ identities.149 In most instances, any attempt to force disclosure 
of an identity will eventually lead the inquiring party to the ISP, even after 
third-party content providers submit to disclosure demands.150 Moreover, 
because ISPs provide access to the Internet, physical storage of data, and 
systems used by subscribers and others on the Internet, they may be liable 
for any abuse or illegal use of the services provided.151 However, even 
when the ISP plays a completely passive role by only providing Internet 
access to an end-user, the ISP has the burden of deciding when, to whom, 
and under what circumstances the end-user’s identity may be revealed.152 
C.  Anonymity: A Matter of Degree or Categorical Assumption? 
Finally, courts seem to follow the principle that anonymity is a matter of 
degree, measured by the activity to which it seeks to extend.153 Even within 
the context of “speech,” the First Amendment provides only limited 
anonymity.154 For example, where the ‘speech’ is copyright infringement, 
                                                                                                                           
forced to adopt IPv6, which utilizes 128-bit addresses and provides 2128 possible devises to 
connect to the Internet simultaneously. Although the Internet is far from comprehensive 
implementation of IPv6, the move towards IPv6 is imminent. (For example, a group of large 
Internet companies have agreed to begin enabling IPv6 on “World IPv6 Day”—June 8, 
2011. http://isoc.org/wp/worldipv6day/). Since static addressing would be more plausible 
under IPv6, the viability of an address/subscriber registry would be possible.  
 147. NICOLL, supra note 19, at 100. See discussion supra Part I.A.  
 148. NICOLL, supra note 19, at 100. See also supra note 26. 
 149. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 150. Id. 
 151. The DMCA was enacted largely to address these issues. See supra Part II.C.  
 152. See Raynolds, supra note 72, at 373 (noting “the ISP remains a central, significant, 
and highly involved third-party because it is responsible for transferring requests and 
information to and from the RIAA and the user”). 
 153. Arista Records LLC, v. Does 1-16, 2009 WL 414060, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing 
Music Ent. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)). 
 154. Id. 
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the privacy interests are “exceedingly small.”155 Within the scope of 
Internet activity, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that “First Amendment 
rights are fully applicable to communications over the [I]nternet.”156 But 
not all “communication” is awarded First Amendment shielding. 
Determining which activities deserve First Amendment protection requires 
the balancing of various factors.157 
This inquiry is of significant importance in the case at hand. Both the 
Plaintiffs and Defendants acknowledge that certain activities are protected 
by First Amendment anonymity, but they disagree sharply on how this is to 
be applied.158 Defendants assert a broad application of the term “speech” to 
include: “downloading, distributing, or making music available.”159 They 
contend that anything within the category of “speech” must be weighed 
against a party’s “substantial and particularized” interest.160 Plaintiffs do 
not disagree with the claim that First Amendment protected speech provides 
a qualified privilege, but they categorically disagree that any Internet 
“communication” is presumptively a form of “speech.”161 
There are many more issues raised in this case than those listed here, but 
the three issues discussed above are especially significant in most legal 
disputes involving the identity of an Internet user. A right to anonymity has 
become so broadly assumed that it is almost treated as a “fundamental 
right” requiring a substantial showing to overcome.162 This places a 
                                                                                                                           
 155. Arista Records LLC v. John Does 1-19, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 156. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 20, Arista Records LLC, v. Doe 3, 2009 WL 
414060 (N.D.N.Y. 2009), appeal docketed, No. 09-0905-cv (2nd Cir. Apr. 22, 2009). 
 157. See Does 1-16, 2009 WL 414060, at *4. 
 158. The agreement and disagreement between the parties exhibits an important 
observation: that “[t]he law does not determine what privacy is, but only what situations of 
privacy will be afforded legal protection.” Hymen Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 34, 36 (1967) quoted in DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY, 
INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY 39 (2d ed. 2009) (noting that “[p]rivacy as a concept 
involves what privacy entails and how it is to be valued. Privacy as a right involves the 
extent to which privacy is (and should be) legally protected”).  
 159. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 20, Arista Records LLC, v. Doe 3, 2009 WL 
414060 (N.D.N.Y. 2009), appeal docketed, No. 09-0905-cv (2nd Cir. Apr. 22, 2009) (citing 
Sony Music Ent. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Fonovisa, Inc. v. 
Does 1-9, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27170, at *29 (W.D. Pa. April 3, 2008)). 
 160. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 20, Arista Records LLC, v. Doe 3, 2009 WL 
414060 (N.D.N.Y. 2009), appeal docketed, No. 09-0905-cv (2d Cir. Apr. 22, 2009) 
 161. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 17, Arista Records LLC, v. Doe 3, 2009 WL 414060 
(N.D.N.Y. 2009), appeal docketed, No. 09-0905-cv (2d Cir. Apr. 22, 2009). 
 162. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 21, Arista Records LLC, v. Doe 3, 2009 WL 
414060 (N.D.N.Y. 2009), appeal docketed, No. 09-0905-cv (2d Cir. Apr. 22, 2009). 
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tremendous burden on ISPs to act as a guardian and protector of their 
subscribers’ identities. Without becoming actively involved in any illegal 
activity, this assumed role entangles ISPs in any legal action against a 
subscriber. 
IV.  RETHINKING ISP ROLE AS GUARDIAN AND PROTECTOR 
Since its genesis in 1998, the DMCA has played a tremendous role in the 
development of the Internet and has been hailed as “the law that saved the 
web.”163 Despite several shortcomings, the DMCA has proven successful, 
and arguably crucial, in accommodating many cultural and business 
Internet trends over the past decade.164 The DMCA will continue to be a 
vital piece of legislation supporting the developing Internet; however, 
several key issues must be resolved. First, the scope and limits of First 
Amendment protection pertaining to Internet communications must be 
clearly defined. Second, as the Internet develops, the Internet culture must 
be held to a higher standard of responsibility.165 In a sense, the “age of 
innocence” has passed, and subscribers and end-users must be responsible 
for their activities and the protection of their identity.166 Third, the DMCA 
should be amended, or reinterpreted, to provide legal procedures to acquire 
the identity of anonymous users from ISPs. Finally, in the alternative to the 
third issue, courts should interpret the DMCA to accommodate 
contemporary trends by reading section 512(a) as only limiting ISP’s 
secondary liability if the ISP complies with a copyright owners request for 
an infringers’ identifying information.  
                                                                                                                           
 163. David Karvets, 10 Years Later, Misunderstood DMCA is the Law That Saved the 
Web, WIRED (Oct. 27, 2008), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/10/ten-years-later. 
 164. Id.  
 165. Internet content providers are beginning to notice this need and react accordingly. 
See Julie Zhuo, Where Anonymity Breeds Contempt, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2010, at 31 
(noting that “until the age of the Internet, anonymity was a rare thing. When someone spoke 
in public, his audience would naturally be able to see who was talking” and noting a 
negative consequence to Internet anonymity as “online disinhibition effect”: “Psychological 
research has proven again and again that anonymity increases unethical behavior. Road rage 
bubbles up in the relative anonymity of one’s car. And in the online world, which can offer 
total anonymity, the effect is even more pronounced. People—even ordinary, good people—
often change their behavior in radical ways.” Id. (emphasis added)) 
 166. Zhuo, supra note 165. 
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A. Limits to First Amendment Protection: Distinguishing Source  
and Content 
First Amendment protection, while extending to “expression on the 
Internet,”167 does not extend to copyright infringement168 and affords such 
communications only an “exceedingly small” privacy interest.169 What 
“exceedingly small” privacy interest the First Amendment does afford is 
unsettled.170 In In re Verizon the court measured “the degree of protection” 
by the type of conduct in question.171 Since copyright infringement was 
alleged, the protection afforded was minimal.172 This measurement of 
protection, the court in In re Verizon held, is determined in the pleadings: 
“In order to obtain a subpoena, the copyright owner must, in effect, plead a 
prima facie case of copyright infringement.”173 Many fear that permitting a 
plaintiff to unveil the identity of an individual after meeting such minimal 
requirements—alleging wrongdoing—could have a “serious chilling effect 
on anonymous speech.”174 However, this requirement is also a sensible and 
logical approach to John Doe litigation. 
The First Amendment provides various degrees of protection to both the 
individual engaging in the communication and the actual content therein.175 
                                                                                                                           
 167. Arista Records v. Does 1-16, 2009 WL 414060, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 168. Id. See In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 260 (D.D.C., 2003); 
see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters, 471 U.S. 539, 555-560 (1985)). 
 169. Arista Records LLC v. Does 1-19, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2008) (“First 
Amendment privacy interests are exceedingly small where the ‘speech’ is the alleged 
infringement of copyrights.”). 
 170. Compare Sony Music Ent. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(finding defendant’s alleged conduct of P2P file copying qualified as an exercise of speech, 
but only to a degree), with A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1028 (9th Cir. 
2001) (holding that the First Amendment does not protect use of a P2P file-sharing network 
that constitutes copyright infringement). 
 171. In re Verizon, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 260. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 263. 
 174. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 21, Arista Records LLC v. Doe 3, No. 09-0905-cv 
(2d Cir. Mar. 26, 2009). 
 175. The distinction between these two is critical in cases involving anonymity. There 
exists a “recognized right to speak and write anonymously and to participate anonymously in 
group activities.” The Constitutional Right to Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosure and the 
Devil, 70 YALE L.J. 1084 (1961) (discussing the debate over the constitutional “freedom of 
anonymity”). However, not all content of speech and communication is constitutionally 
protected. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (noting that the 
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In Internet copyright infringement cases the dual First Amendment 
protections can be seen as protecting what a person does online (conduct 
and content), and who an individual is while online (source).176 This 
distinction between conduct or content and source is important in 
determining what degree of protection the First Amendment affords.177 The 
conduct of an individual leads to matters of the source of that conduct and 
relates directly to issues of identity. Any content produced by a person’s 
online conduct is an issue of subject matter, and is loosely or indirectly 
related to the identity of the individual. Courts already consider the content 
in question when evaluating and determining the degree of First 
Amendment protection afforded to the conduct and identity of the 
individual,178 but both categories deserve special individual attention.  
First Amendment protection extends to a wide range of content on the 
Internet. In Reno v. ACLU, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that 
speech on the Internet is entitled to the full First Amendment protection 
extended to newspapers and other print media.179 In Reno, the Court 
considered the constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act, 
which prohibited “the knowing transmission of obscene or indecent 
messages to any recipient under 18 years of age.”180 The term 
“transmission” refers to emails, file-sharing, and other “indecent 
communications.”181 The Court found the Act unconstitutional as a 
violation of the First Amendment, concluding that “[t]he interest in 
encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society outweighs any 
                                                                                                                           
“government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas,” but that “the constitutional 
protection accorded to a communication containing such patently offensive sexual and 
excretory language need not be the same in every context”). Id. at 737-47. 
 176. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (holding that a state’s compelling 
interest in prohibiting child pornography justifies laws banning mere possession of such 
materials). But in civil cases, courts are hesitant to force the disclosure of anonymous users’ 
identities and require that the seeking plaintiff follow strict procedural requirements to 
convince the courts that a breach of the First Amendment privacy right is necessary. See 
Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 577 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
 177. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (comparing Internet users 
communicating in “chat rooms” to the “pamphleteer” in Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 
(1960), thus extending the high level of First Amendment protection to communications 
over the Internet). 
 178. See supra note 139. 
 179. See generally Reno, 521 U.S. at 844-45. 
 180. Id. at 859. 
 181. Id. at 867, 894. 
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theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship.”182 In the decade since Reno 
was decided, the scope of First Amendment protection in the Internet, and 
what qualifies as a constitutionally protected “communication,” has been 
widely debated and refined.183 
Freedom of speech protection has been limited or withheld from three 
primary types of content communicated over the Internet: obscenity 
(specifically child pornography),184 defamation and libel,185 and copyright 
infringement.186 After the decision in Reno was handed down, Congress 
enacted a series of legislation attempting to prohibit the sharing of child 
pornography over the Internet.187 Each enactment has been adjudicated and 
refined to comport to the First Amendment, but the general rule now 
accepted is that it is unlawful to “knowingly possess” child pornography.188 
Although transmitting and sharing contraband images and videos are forms 
of “communication,” their illicit content is of a subject matter that is 
permissibly regulated. 
Similarly, libelous and defamatory statements have limited First 
Amendment protection on the Internet. The Internet proffers seemingly 
unrestricted communication to an international audience. As one scholar 
notes: 
                                                                                                                           
 182. Id. at 885. 
 183. See Tom W. Bell, Free Speech, Strict Scrutiny, and Self-Help: How Technology 
Upgrades Constitutional Jurisprudence, 87 MINN. L. REV. 743 (2003) (noting “the effect of 
advancing technologies on constitutional interpretation” addressed in Reno and subsequent 
courts urging individuals to “understand that responsibility as an unavoidable cost of 
enjoying freedom of speech.” Id. at 778 n.155, 778). 
 184. See United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 519 U.S. 820 
(1996) (finding couple guilty of knowingly transporting obscene files in interstate commerce 
under a federal obscenity statute because of a computer bulletin board service). 
 185. See Scheff v. Bock, No. 03022837 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Spt. 19, 2006) (ordering blogger to 
pay judgment of $11.35 million to Sue Scheff, the head of a child services referral company 
for calling her a “fraud” and a “con artist” on a blog). 
 186. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (finding publishers that allowed 
third parties to republish online articles by freelance writers originally published in print 
without obtaining the writers’ permission violated the writers’ copy rights). 
 187. See e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2252A; Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the 
Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003); 
“Children’s Internet Protection Act,” Pub. L. No. 106-554 47 (47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6) (2002) 
and 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(1) (2003)). 
 188. See, e.g., United States v. Stulock, 308 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2002) (upholding 
defendants conviction for possession of child pornography after investigators found three 
images of child pornography in the cache on defendant’s computer). 
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The “old” mass media—newspapers, magazines, books, and 
broadcasters—place a gatekeeper between the speaker and her 
audience. The Internet removed that gatekeeper, allowing more 
speakers than ever before to reach a mass audience. The 
resulting “democratization of discourse” made it harder for those 
in power to control the interpretation of public events and 
exposed them to criticism from new quarters.189 
Of the variety of forums on the Internet available to the “mass audience,” 
blogs and online message boards are the subject of tremendous controversy, 
and often give rise to litigation for libelous remarks.190 As “those who are 
the subjects of unflattering anonymous speech” seek to redress their 
grievances, they face the same difficulties in identifying the attacker and 
often bring suits against “John Doe” defendants.191 Message boards and 
blogs are deemed public forums, and the anonymity of those who 
communicate in these forums is rigorously protected as an important 
privacy right.192 Accordingly, discovering the identity of an individual who 
made allegedly defamatory remarks will prove to be difficult for the 
plaintiff.193  
 In many situations, individuals and their communications are protected 
by the third-party that provided the means for communication. Certain 
services, such as online newspapers and weblog publishers, will very often 
resist inquiries into the identity of bloggers and commentors, and will 
faithfully resist subpoenas.194 In situations where communications are not 
made under the protective umbrella of a third-party, however, the 
expectation for privacy tends to revert to the ISP, which may have had very 
                                                                                                                           
 189. Lyrissa B. Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace: What Can We Learn From John 
Doe?, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1373, 1375 (2009) (discussing the issue of anonymity in libel 
lawsuits against Internet defendants). 
 190. See Laura Parker, Courts Are Asked to Crack Down on Bloggers, Websites, USA 
Today (Oct. 3, 2006), available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-10-02-
bloggers-courts_x.htm. 
 191. HART, supra note 7, at 33-35. 
 192. See Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999) 
(noting a “legitimate and valuable right to participate in online forums anonymously or 
pseudonymously” that must be weighed against “the need to provide injured parties with an 
forum in which they may seek redress for grievances”).  
 193. See, e.g., Doe v. 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001). See 
also, Jon Hart & Michael Rothberg, Anonymous Internet Postings Pit Free Speech Against 
Accountability, WSJ.COM (Mar. 8, 2002), http://online.wsj.com/ 
public/resources/documents/SB1015251972510360720.htm. 
 194.  See, e.g., Enterline v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 751 F. Supp. 2d 782 (M.D. Pa. 2008).  
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little involvement in the communication message, or the methods used to 
communicate.  
B. Place the Burden on the End-User 
The Internet has developed to the point where ISPs should no longer be 
expected to shield the identity of their subscribers from inquiring litigants. 
As the on-line culture matures and evolves, the individuals who connect to 
it naturally become more tech-savvy, use more on-line services, and 
become more informed of their rights and responsibilities. The average 
reasonable user should, accordingly, be presumed to understand the 
consequences of his actions, and able to determine the means to protect 
their interests.195 In terms of the on-line piracy that this Comment has 
addressed, the reasonable user likely understands that sharing copyrighted 
files is generally unlawful, and, at least, mindful of the danger of litigation 
or prosecution if caught pirating materials.196 In a sense, the age of 
innocence and naiveté has passed, and the individual should now be held to 
an enlightened position, responsible for his actions and accountable for his 
conduct, both online and offline.197 
As part of this new era, the expectation of privacy and anonymity on the 
Internet must be reexamined. Criminal law, particularly the area of law 
dealing with privacy expectations under the Fourth Amendment, offers an 
excellent resource for analysis.198 In Katz v. United States, the Supreme 
                                                                                                                           
 195. Close to eighty percent of the United States population currently have Internet 
access, a remarkable growth from the limited 0.8% in 1990. Internet Users as a Percentage 
of Population, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/publicdata?ds=wb-wdi&met_y=it_net_user 
(select “World” or individual country under “Public Data” column on left) (last visited June 
20, 2011).  
 196. For example, following the recent introduction of Sweden’s attempt to pass anti-
piracy legislation known as IPRED, one technology group noted that the country saw a thirty 
percent drop in network traffic. They noted that “[m]any attributed this fall to Internet users 
become [sic] scared that they would be caught downloading and sharing copyright material.” 
Illicit File-Sharing and Streaming of TV Shows Increases, TORRENTFREAK (Feb. 17, 2010), 
http://torrentfreak.com/illicit-file-sharing-and-streaming-of-tv-shows-increases-100217/. 
 197. Sweden is an excellent example of a society where individuals are assuming 
responsibility for their own protection and taking active measures to hide their identity. As 
certain reports indicate, between six and seven percent of the Swedish population hide their 
identity while on the Internet. Millions of File-Sharers Hide Their Identities Online, 
TORRENTFREAK (Nov. 3, 2009), http://torrentfreak.com/millions-of-file-sharers-hide-their-
identities-online-091103 (referencing a study undertaken by Måns Svensson, Ph.D. in 
Sociology of Law in Lund).  
 198. This Comment does not suggest that all Fourth Amendment implications are 
applicable here, only that the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test first proffered in Katz 
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Court established the “legitimate expectation of privacy” test.199 
Considering what privacy rights an individual has, even when allegedly 
conducting illegal activities, the Court applied a two-part test: first, did the 
individual possess a subjective expectation of privacy, and second, was that 
expectation objectively “one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”200 Although this inquiry is intended to define whether an 
individual is afforded privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment, the 
rationale and logic behind this analysis is profoundly applicable to 
expectations of anonymity privacy on the Internet.201 
The first part of the Katz test considers whether an individual, by his 
conduct, has “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy.”202 
Broadening this inquiry and applying it to Internet users as a whole presents 
an interesting question: what degree of privacy does the average reasonable 
user expect? But this cannot be easily or even generally answered. Each 
activity or transaction on the Internet carries its own expectations.203 For 
example, a bidder on eBay may expect that his limited online profile will be 
revealed to other bidders, while his true identity along with financial 
information will be revealed to the seller if he succeeds in outbidding 
                                                                                                                           
and Smith translates well in civil law contexts. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(b) (West) 
(constructing civil liability for invasion of privacy: “A person is liable for constructive 
invasion of privacy when the defendant attempts to capture, in a manner that is offensive to a 
reasonable person, any type of visual image, sound recording, or other physical impression 
of the plaintiff engaging in a personal or familial activity under circumstances in which the 
plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy”) (emphasis added). 
 199. 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 738 (1979) 
(naming and applying the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test to pen registers). 
 200. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 201. The Internet protocols for many online forms of communication still resemble, and 
arguably rely on, the communication technology at issue in both Smith (decided in 1979) and 
Katz (1979). See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(concluding that “the surveillance techniques the government employed here are 
constitutionally indistinguishable from the use of a pen register that the Court approved in 
Smith.”); In re Application for an Order Authorizing use of A Pen Register And Trap On 
(XXX) Internet Service Account/User Name, (xxxxxxxx@xxx.com), 396 F. Supp. 2d 45 
(D.Mass. 2005) (considering the use of pen registers and trap and trace devices to monitor 
Internet account activities). See also Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion Cnty., Ind., 566 F. Supp. 2d 
862, 881 (S.D. Ind. 2008) (applying other principles of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to 
searches of computers and noting “If monitoring does not invade genuine private content, 
then there may be no search subject to the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 202. Id. at 740. 
 203. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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others.204 However, this expectation of privacy is related more to the 
individual’s financial interests than the legality of his transactions. 
Similarly, individuals may assume that their Google searches, blog posts, or 
other online activities are awarded a degree of privacy that prohibits 
unwarranted inquiries.205 In contrast, in a post-Napster takedown era, it 
would be hard to find anyone who is unaware that involvement in unlawful 
file-sharing poses potential legal actions and penalties.206 In theory, a multi-
tasking Internet user may browse blogs, the web shop on eBay, and be 
running file-sharing software downloading unauthorized material 
simultaneously, with his expectation of privacy varying with each 
activity.207 Therefore, individuals’ expectation of privacy may generally be 
assumed as directly relating to the type of activity or content the individual 
views, shares, or downloads on the Internet. 
The second part of the Katz test asks, “whether the individual’s 
subjective expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”208 This inquiry produces a broad and interesting 
range of answers and opinions. As a preliminary matter, it is important to 
note that the debate over anonymity is largely focused on which activities 
deserve anonymity.209 This Comment, however, is focused on the 
procedures to discovery identity, and necessarily assumes that there are 
instances where the right to anonymity is outweighed by the right or interest 
served in litigating a dispute.210 Accordingly, the question turns on who 
                                                                                                                           
 204. Bidding Overview, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/buy/bidding-overview.html 
(last visited Apr. 22, 2011). 
 205. The legitimacy of this expectation is currently a hot topic as the recent introduction 
of ‘Google Buzz’ has prompted public concern and a class action lawsuit. See Nicholas 
Carlson, WARNING: Google Buzz Has a Huge Privacy Flaw, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 10, 
2010), available at http://www.businessinsider.com/warning-google-buzz-has-a-huge-
privacy-flaw-2010-2. 
 206. See supra notes 197-98.  
 207. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 208. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) 
(Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 209. See supra note 158. 
 210. Courts often apply a balancing test in these cases. See, e.g., John Doe v. 
2theMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001). In adopting a standard for 
“evaluating a civil subpoena that seeks the identity of an anonymous Internet user who is not 
a party to the underlying litigation,” the court weighed whether:  
(1) the subpoena seeking the information was issued in good faith and not for 
any improper purpose, (2) the information sought relates to a core claim or 
defense, (3) the identifying information is directly and materially relevant to 
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protects the user’s identity, or how anonymity is afforded. To explain this 
distinction, it is necessary to consider the structure of the Internet and its 
various components. 
As discussed above, an individual accessing the Internet from his home, 
work, or school has some form of contractual relationship with the ISP.211 
Once connected to the Internet, most websites the individual visits212 will 
also stipulate some form of contractual terms of service agreement.213 Email 
                                                                                                                           
that claim or defense, and (4) information sufficient to establish or to disprove 
that claim or defense is unavailable from any other source.  
Id. at 1095.  
 211. For example, Comcast, one of the largest Internet providers in the United States, 
explicitly addresses in all capital letters:  
YOU AGREE THAT YOU SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR AND SHALL 
DEFEND, INDEMNIFY, AND HOLD HARMLESS COMCAST AND ITS 
EMPLOYEES, AFFILIATES, SUPPLIERS, AGENTS AND 
CONTRACTORS AND SHALL REIMBURSE US FOR ANY DAMAGES, 
LOSSES OR EXPENSES (INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, 
REASONABLE ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS) INCURRED BY US IN 
CONNECTION WITH ANY CLAIMS, SUITS, JUDGMENTS, AND 
CAUSES OF ACTION ARISING OUT OF (a) YOUR USE OF THE 
SERVICE OR COMCAST EQUIPMENT; (b) VIOLATION OR 
INFRINGEMENT OF CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS, PRIVACY, 
CONFIDENTIALITY, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK, TRADE 
SECRET, OR OTHER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PROPRIETARY 
RIGHTS ARISING FROM YOUR USE OF THE SERVICE OR ANY 
UNAUTHORIZED APPARATUS OR SYSTEM. 
Comcast Agreement for Residential Services, COMCAST, available at 
http://www.comcast.com/Corporate/Customers/Policies/SubscriberAgreement.html (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2011). 
 212. It is important to remember that a person may still rely on pseudonyms with any 
online activity, so the information governed by EUAs is somewhat limited in how effective 
they are. The information retained, when not linked directly to financial information, may 
still not contain any positive identifying information.  
 213. For example, Facebook declares in its terms of service that:  
By using or accessing Facebook, you agree to this Statement. . . . (1) For 
content that is covered by intellectual property rights, like photos and videos 
(“IP content”), you specifically give us the following permission, subject to 
your privacy and application settings: you grant us a non-exclusive, 
transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide license to use any IP 
content that you post on or in connection with Facebook (“IP License”). This 
IP License ends when you delete your IP content or your account unless your 
content has been shared with others, and they have not deleted it. (2) When you 
delete IP content, it is deleted in a manner similar to emptying the recycle bin 
on a computer. However, you understand that removed content may persist in 
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services almost universally regulate subscribers’ use through the terms of 
service.214 Some form of contractual relationship between the end-user and 
service provider governs almost every transaction, service, site visit, and 
activity that occurs on the Internet.215 However, for those forms of 
communication, such as P2P file-sharing, where no intermediate content or 
service provider exists, no “terms of service” agreements govern the 
transactions between individuals.216 And where no third-party is in a 
position to secure an individual’s identity, the expectation of protection is 
presumed to, almost by default, shift to the ISP itself.217 In these situations, 
where no controlling third party may be complained to or is in the position 
to control the end-user’s activity, the ISP assumes a de facto position of 
regulating the user’s activity (for example, by port blocking or terminating 
                                                                                                                           
backup copies for a reasonable period of time (but will not be available to 
others).  
Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK.COM, http://www.facebook.com/ 
terms.php (last visited Apr. 10, 2011)  
 214. For example, Gmail’s “Privacy Policy” states that Google:  
maintains and processes your Gmail account and its contents to provide the 
Gmail service to you and to improve our services. The Gmail service includes 
relevant advertising and related links based on the IP address, content of 
messages and other information related to your use of Gmail.  
Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE, http://www.tosback.org/diff.php?vid=1087 (last visited 
Apr. 23, 2011).  
 215. Some courts place tremendous weight on these contractual agreements, and interpret 
a subscriber’s expectation of privacy based on the language in the terms of service. See, e.g., 
Sony Music Entm’t Inc. v. Does 1-40 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  
 216. Attempts to prosecute or sue individuals involved in P2P activities often have a 
difficult time determining who should be held liable. A noteworthy consequence of this 
structure can be seen in the controversial Swedish case against the Pirate Bay, a Swedish 
website that indexes BitTorrent files. Although the technology of indexing BitTorrent files 
does not involve the storage or communication of unlawful content, the Swedish court found 
the Pirate Bay administrators guilty of “assisting in making copyright content available.” 
The Pirate Bay Trial: The Official Verdict—Guilty, TORRENTFREAK (Apr. 17, 2011), 
http://torrentfreak.com/the-pirate-bay-trial-the-verdict-090417. The legitimacy of claims 
against providers of indexers or trackers is beyond the scope of this Comment, but this is a 
subject that deserves significant thought and consideration.  
 217. The de facto subscriber/provider status will almost always be the last stop before 
reaching the individual user. This Comment acknowledges that “IP addresses aren’t people” 
and that it merely identifies the subscriber’s connection, which may be shared among many 
different people. Litigants may necessarily need to clear an additional hurdle by overcoming 
any defenses that the connection was not in the exclusive control or use of the owner. 
578 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:541 
 
 
service), or providing the user’s information to requesting parties to allow 
further injunctive or judicial actions.218 
Considering the second part of the Katz test under these observations, the 
question must necessarily be narrowed to: what is a reasonable expectation 
of privacy that an ISP should be expected to provide to its subscribers? The 
“expectation of privacy” in this instance may be very narrowly defined as: 
the disclosed association of a user’s true identity with the IP address he or 
she was assigned at a given point in time. The DMCA responded to this 
question in part by rejecting any notion of anonymous privacy when the 
activities in question show a prima facie case of copyright infringement.219 
Therefore, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy where the activity 
in question is unlawful.220 Procedurally, however, this conclusion misses a 
key issue: the ISP is still placed in the position as a form of content-
regulator, despite its actual role as merely a passive gateway.221 
Application of the Katz test in this context reveals two important 
observations: first, individuals are most likely aware that their expectation 
of privacy is directly related to their activities.222 Accordingly, the degree of 
caution with which people access and share information is usually directly 
                                                                                                                           
 218. These steps are often taken at the ISP’s own initiative in an attempt to curb 
bandwidth overloads. See Fink v. Time Warner Cable, 2009 WL 2207920 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(dismissing a nation-wide class action claim against Time Warner Cable for throttling 
BitTorrent use on procedural grounds). But see Declan McCullagh, FCC Formally Rules 
Comcast’s Throttling of BitTorrent was Illegal, CNET NEWS (Aug. 1, 2008, 8:19 AM), 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10004508-38.html (reporting an order released by the 
FCC threatening to adjudicate disputes involving “discriminatory network management”). 
The availability of these restrictions, however, does not suggest ISPs should be expected to 
proactively implement them at the command of private parties, or submit to subpoena 
inquiries. See Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 
1229, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the DMCA does not permit the issuance of 
subpoenas when an ISP acts as a mere conduit for P2P file-sharing “because [ISPs] do[] not 
control the content on its subscribers’ computers”) (emphasis added). 
 219. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (providing subpoena power to copyright owners upon “a 
sworn declaration to the effect that the purpose for which the subpoena is sought is to obtain 
the identity of an alleged infringer and that such information will only be used for the 
purpose of protecting rights”). 
 220. See Sony Music Entm’t Inc., 326 F. Supp. 2d at 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding 
“defendants have little expectation of privacy in downloading and distributing copyrighted 
songs without permission”). 
 221. See supra Part II.C. 
 222. See supra note 196. 
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related to the service or content provider with which they interact.223 As an 
individual’s finances, community reputation, and other protected interests 
become more vulnerable, the individual is more inclined to exercise greater 
care in choosing who they transact with, the content of their 
communications, and how they transmit the sensitive information.224 
Second, the law, in general, denies the privilege of anonymity when illegal 
conduct is in question.225 Various laws provide procedural safeguards for 
service or content providers to limit their liability and provide procedural 
remedies for injured individuals to protect their interests.226 These laws, in a 
sense, clear the way and create direct access to the party acting unlawfully, 
while limiting the collateral damage and unnecessary involvement to the 
passive agents whose services the individual has used in their unlawful 
actions.227 For example, if a derogatory comment is made on an individual’s 
Facebook “wall,” or if an individual posts a defamatory “tweet” on Twitter, 
Facebook and Twitter will not be held liable.228 Rather, if a legal action is 
brought against the commenter or “tweeter,” Facebook and Twitter may 
choose to provide the user’s information upon request, per the terms of 
                                                                                                                           
 223. Julie Zhuo, a product design manager at Facebook, acknowledged in a recent New 
York Times article that “[c]ontent providers, social networking platforms and community 
sites must also do their part by rethinking the systems they have in place for user 
commentary as to discourage—or disallow—anonymity.” Julie Zhuo, Where Anonymity 
Breeds Contempt, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2010, at 31. Discussing the problem of Internet 
“trolls” (individuals who post “inflammatory, derogatory or provocative messages”), Zhuo 
noted that “most trolls wouldn’t have the gall to say to another person’s face half the things 
they anonymously post on the Internet.” Id. Zhuo described her work on Facebook’s 
commenting system, where “the approach is to try to replicate real-world social norms by 
emphasizing the human qualities of conversation,” as creating a form of “social pressure” 
that works in reducing the problem of trolling. Id.  
 224. Id.  
 225. See supra Part II.C. 
 226. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) (limiting the liability of ISPs: “only if the service 
provider (A) has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account 
holders of the service provider’s system or network of, a policy that provides for the 
termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service 
provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers; and (B) accommodates and does not 
interfere with standard technical measures”). 
 227. Id. 
 228. Finkel v. Facebook, Inc., 2009 WL 3240365 (2009) (dismissing Facebook’s motion 
to dismiss a defamation action against it for defamatory comments made in a “group page” 
on Facebook “because Facebook is immune from liability under the Communications 
Decency Act of 1996 as an interactive computer service”). 
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service that govern the subscriber’s relationship.229 Therefore, it is 
reasonable to expect individuals to gauge the degree of privacy afforded in 
a particular forum by the content provider’s terms of service, reputation for 
fighting or submitting to disclosure requests, and type of activities that the 
content provider permits.230 Still, in the context of P2P applications where 
individuals connect directly with one another without third party mediation, 
what degree of expectation should an individual reasonably expect? 
The logical conclusion first requires an acknowledgement that 
individuals understand their Internet activities are afforded only qualified 
privacy, the degree of which is determined in large part by the company 
providing the content or permitting the online activities.231 These third 
parties are able to connect the content with the source of that content. 
Beyond the scope of third-party services, an individual is emancipated from 
moderators and ‘terms of use,’ but is also vulnerable.232 Who he connects 
with, how he communicates, and what content is shared is, for the most 
part, determined by the individual.233 However, if his conduct leads to legal 
action, his ISP may be forced to determine the degree of the subscriber’s 
privacy it will fight to protect. But unlike other third-party service 
providers, ISPs have limited control or interaction with any content the 
subscriber may produce, and yet still hold the final key to the source of the 
content.  
This Comment proposes that the party with the greatest control over the 
content communicated over the Internet be primarily responsible for 
protecting the source of that content. Accordingly, if the communications 
                                                                                                                           
 229. See, e.g., John Schwartz, Twitter Fighting Pennsylvania Subpoena Seeking Names 
of 2 Tweeters, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2010, at B4. Admittedly, Facebook or Twitter may only 
be able to provide the IP address associated with the account, but this still reflects the 
principle that this Comment argues should be adopted at the ISP level. 
 230. This is largely already the case. See Claire Cain Miller & Tanzina Vega, Google 
Introduces a Social Tool, and Settles Charges Related to Another, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 
2011, at B3.  
 231. See supra notes 26, 212, 214 and accompanying text. 
 232. Many BitTorrent users understand the precarious position that this P2P protocol 
affords, and ban together behind “private trackers” (virtual communities where membership 
is by invite only). Ben Jones, Trading BitTorrent Tracker Invites, Commodity or Curse?, 
TORRENTFREAK (Jan. 15, 2008), http://torrentfreak.com/trading-bittorrent-tracker-invites-
080115/. But see Enigmax, Mass BitTorrent Lawsuits Now Target Private Trackers, 
TORRENTFREAK (July 25, 2010), http://torrentfreak.com/mass-bittorrent-lawsuits-now-target-
private-tracker-100725/ (reporting that even private trackers are targeted in mass BitTorrent 
lawsuits). 
 233. Ernesto, Keep the Bad Guys Out, TORRENTFREAK (Jan. 7, 2006), 
http://torrentfreak.com/keep-the-bad-guys-out. 
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involve direct P2P interaction, the individual should be primarily 
responsible for establishing their own rules, determining their own conduct, 
protecting their identity, and defending their privacy if an inquiry is 
brought.234 While anonymity is a de facto status for many transactions in 
which the individual may reasonably assume full privacy, other 
communications provide very little or no expectation of privacy, and offer 
only illusory anonymity.235 One such limited, self-regulating, form of 
communication is BitTorrent.236 
Without narrowly confining this analysis to BitTorrent communications, 
a solution to the DMCA’s shortcomings is simple: look to the form of 
communication to determine the propriety of a subpoena.237 For example, if 
the conduct in question relates to a Facebook comment, the individual 
should expect the degree of privacy Facebook provides in their terms of 
service,238 and subpoenas should be issued to Facebook if such terms do not 
protect the activity of the individual.239 Additionally, if the conduct relates 
                                                                                                                           
 234. See supra note 58. Because P2P file-sharing effectively places individuals in a 
position very similar to third-party service providers, this Comment argues that it is 
reasonable to assume they share a similar degree of liability. 
 235. See supra Part II.A–B.  
 236. See supra notes 65, 215, 217, 233. 
 237. To clarify: this relates only to revelation of the user’s identity, not the content of 
their communications. See supra Part IV.A. 
 238. Privacy Guide, supra note 26. 
 239. The DMCA is currently applied in this manner in these types of cases, insofar as the 
content provider (i.e., Facebook) will not be held liable for most actions of their subscribers. 
See supra, notes 75-79 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, an inquiring may still only 
produce the IP address associated with the account, and the inquiring party will still need to 
convince the ISP to surrender the identity of the user. There is already a prevalent 
expectation that content providers establish clear and resolute privacy and protection 
standards. See, e.g., Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong. 
(2011). This bill, introduced by John Kerry and John McCain, is designed “[t]o establish a 
regulatory framework for the comprehensive protection of personal data for individuals 
under the aegis of the Federal Trade Commission, and for other purposes.” In the section 
addressing, entitled Privacy By Design, the relevant text reads: 
  Each covered entity shall, in a manner proportional to the size, type, and 
nature of the covered information that it collects, implement a comprehensive 
information privacy program by—  
  (1) incorporating necessary development processes and practices throughout 
the product life cycle that are designed to safeguard the personally identifiable 
information that is covered information of individuals based on— 
  (A) the reasonable expectations of such individuals regarding privacy; and  
  (B) the relevant threats that need to be guarded against in meeting those 
expectations; 
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to a defamatory blog post with a blogging service that refuses to disclose a 
subscriber’s identity unless required to do so by a court order, that 
individual has an expectation of privacy and subpoenas should not be 
issued until the conduct in question is deemed defamatory by a court and 
the individual may reasonably expect the blog provider to fight to protect 
her identity.240 If, however, the conduct relates to unlawfully sharing 
copyrighted materials directly with other individuals, the infringer should 
be expected to defend himself against a copyright owner. Accordingly, a 
copyright owner should be able to acquire the individual’s true identity by 
subpoena so long as the copyright owner presents a prima facie case for 
copyright infringement.241 The individual may then show that there was no 
distribution, that the distribution was lawful, or even that the individual is a 
mistaken defendant—but, either way, it should be the individual’s 
responsibility to defend his position.242 
This solution will theoretically benefit ISPs in several ways. First, this 
would drastically reduce ISPs’ need to involve themselves in litigation 
regarding the activities of their subscribers.243 Most ISPs and content 
                                                                                                                           
Id. § 103. But see Consumer Groups Welcome Bipartisan Privacy Effort, but Warn Kerry-
McCain Bill Insufficient to Protect Consumers’ Online Privacy, PR NEWSWIRE (Apr. 12, 2011), 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/consumer-groups-welcome-bipartisan-privacy-
effort-but-warn-kerry-mccain-bill-insufficient-to-protect-consumers-online-privacy- 
119701399.html (highlighting the concerns of a privacy rights group, including a suggestion 
that: “Consumers must have the right to hold companies accountable for violating their privacy 
through a private right of action.”). 
 240. See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text. 
 241. The showing of a prima facie case is already the first prong in Columbia. See supra 
note 42, and accompanying text. Maintaining this requirement is important to prevent 
abusive litigation and to ensure that “people who have committed no wrong [are] able to 
participate online without fear that someone who wishes to harass or embarrass them can file 
a frivolous lawsuit and thereby gain the power of the court’s order to discover their identity.” 
Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
 242. This Comment notes the controversial nature of this assertion in lieu of the 
extortion-like methods many copyright owners use to enforce their privileges, but suggests 
that if individuals were more informed of their rights and fought back in greater numbers, 
such litigation techniques would ultimately prove unprofitable for plaintiffs. For an excellent 
example of methods available to prospective defendants, see CHILLING EFFECTS, 
http://www.chillingeffects.org (last visited July 2, 2011); How Not to Get Sued for File 
Sharing, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (July, 2006), https://www.eff.org/wp/how-not-
get-sued-file-sharing. 
 243. In Call of the Wild the ISP Time Warner contended that complying with a request 
seeking a large number of its subscribers would cause it to “‘suffer significant harms’ and 
‘incur significant costs’ because compliance . . . would ‘overwhelm’ its capacity and 
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providers already defer to DMCA guidelines for taking down hosted 
infringing materials, and would arguably be equally deferent to more 
intelligible guidelines for revealing identities if such existed. Second, ISPs 
and society as a whole would benefit from neutral ISPs. The more an ISP 
resembles an obstacle in reaching end-users, the more likely that ISPs will 
be forced to take on other forms of censorship and policing.244 But such a 
role should not be expected from companies that merely provide gateway 
access to the Internet. Finally, permitting easier discovery of P2P users’ 
identities more accurately reflects the role of ISPs as a gateway, with 
minimal duties to defend or protect the identity of their subscribers.245 
Clarifying this role would reduce ISPs’ fear that they are betraying their 
subscribers’ trust while apprising end users that they are ultimately 
responsible for their online behavior.  
Individuals may worry that such vulnerability nullifies any possibility of 
privacy or legitimate anonymity, but this fear is unfounded and incorrect. 
Rather, there are a variety of measures one may take to hide his unlawful 
activities, obscure his identity, and ensure his privacy. For example, the 
Pirate Bay, a popular file-sharing service provider, recently opened to the 
public a special VPN service that allows Internet access through a secured 
server that hides the originating IP address, and does not log the associated 
assigned IP address with the user. This effectively creates a third-party 
gateway that neutralizes the possibility to discover the end-user.246 Other 
services, such as Tor or Privoxy, provide measures for individuals to 
communicate anonymously through a series of virtual tunnels.247  
V.  CONCLUSION 
The DMCA has failed to adapt to changing technology. Burdening 
copyright owners with the preliminary requirement of discovering who has 
                                                                                                                           
‘completely absorb the resources for many months.’” Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 
1-1,062, CIV.A. 10-455 BAH, 2011 WL 996786, at *16, (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2011). 
 244. See Matthew Lasar, The Real Internet Censors: Unaccountable ISPs, ARS TECHNICA 
(Feb. 10, 2011, 11:45 AM), http://arstechnica.com/web/news/2011/02/isps-the-off-duty-
cops-of-the-world.ars.  
 245. See supra Part III.B. 
 246. Ernesto, Pirate Bay’s Ipredator VPN Opens to the Public, TORRENTFREAK (Jan. 1, 
2010), http://torrentfreak.com/pirate-bays-ipredator-vpn-opens-to-the-public-090120. 
 247. Tor Project: Overview, TOR, http://www.torproject.org/overview.html (last visited Apr. 
9, 2011). But see Thomas Lowenthal, Not Anonymous: Attack Reveals BitTorrent Users on Tor 
Network, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 12, 2011 10:57 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2011/04/not-anonymous-attack-reveals-bittorrent-users-on-tor-network.ars (noting 
that the popular anonymity tool still has vulnerabilities).  
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infringed upon their rights is an unnecessary encumbrance on protecting 
legitimate property interests. Because the DMCA stands as the primary 
body of legislation addressing the issues that arise with Internet piracy, it 
should be adorned with new provisions or interpretations that allow it to 
carry out its intended purpose. If the outmoded treatment of ISPs as agents 
to subscribers were discarded, the burdens of responsibility and 
accountability would return to individuals. While some courts have adopted 
a broad interpretation of the DMCA allowing for more liberal discovery 
methods, there is yet to be any affirmative policy recognition of the 
evolving Internet culture.248 
Tools to limit an individual’s vulnerability are becoming more accessible 
and more effective for the individual who seeks anonymous activity. As 
these technologies develop, the role of the average domestic ISP should be 
scaled back to what its primary function is: a gateway to the Internet. 
Courts and legislature should no longer consider or treat ISPs as in loco 
parentis of their subscribers’ identity.  
 
                                                                                                                           
 248. See, e.g., Atlantic v. Does 1-25, No. 05-CV-9111 (D.N.Y. June 5, 2006) (denying 
motion to vacate ex parte discovery order); Motown v. Does 1-99, No. 05-CV-9112 (D.N.Y. 
Feb. 10, 2006) (dissolving stay of expedited discovery); Warner v. Does 1-149, No. 05-CV-
8365 (D.N.Y. June 7, 2006) (denying motion to vacate ex parte discovery order and quash 
subpoena). 
